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 More and Better Jobs for Pakistan: Can the Manufacturing Sector Play a 
Greater Role? 
Rashid Amjad1 and Anam Yusuf2 
Introduction 
With a labour force growing at between 3 and 3.5 percent and an economy mired in 
stagflation—with growth averaging just over 3 percent in recent years, together with double-
digit inflation—Pakistan faces a daunting challenge in providing not just more but better jobs to 
its young entrants into the labour market. While reviving economic growth and restoring 
macroeconomic stability remain the top priority of the government and policymakers in the 
immediate future, the real medium- to long-term challenge is to move the economy onto a 
trajectory of not just high, but also inclusive and sustainable, growth.  
The central issue that this paper analyses is the role the manufacturing sector can play in 
reviving and sustaining growth while generating more and better job opportunities as it has 
done in the fast-growing East and Southeast Asian economies. Indeed, it is believed that 
employment in manufacturing—relative to other sectors and forms of employment—can 
generate not just better but also more decent employment opportunities in terms of wages, 
degree of social protection, a voice at work, and protection of workers’ fundamental rights. 
An area of concern is that, while manufacturing has served as a major driver of Pakistan’s 
economic growth in the past, this role is now showing distinct signs of declining. Its 
contribution to employment generation has, after a rapid increase, also slowed down as 
reflected in the sector’s share of the total labour force, which has stagnated at around 12 to 15 
percent over the past few decades. Within manufacturing, the formal or large-scale 
manufacturing sector—the harbinger of the creation of better employment opportunities—has 
contributed a very small portion of the jobs generated, despite accounting for over 80 percent 
(in 2005/063) of the value-added generated by this sector. With a further slowing down in 
manufacturing, especially large-scale manufacturing, even this limited capacity will be 
curtailed.  
This paper analyses both these important issues in some depth. It reviews the evidence to show 
that the contribution of the manufacturing sector to economic growth and employment 
generation has slowed down and identifies the major factors responsible. It then examines 
whether these obstacles can be overcome and proposes policy measures that would help revive 
the role of manufacturing—especially large-scale manufacturing—in driving economic growth 
and generating jobs. 
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A basic premise of this paper is that, while a macro or sectoral approach does provide us with 
some broad indications of the growth and job generation capacity of the manufacturing sector, 
only an in-depth analysis of its changing structure and dynamics will allow us to capture more 
realistically the forces that currently drive the sector. This analysis leads us to conclude that it is 
somewhat premature to signal the demise of manufacturing in propelling future economic 
growth or of its potential to generate more and better jobs for the growing work force. 
Indeed, our findings suggest that the high growth rate of population and the labour force in Pakistan, 
together with the declining trend in economic growth in the last two decades (which has decelerated 
sharply in the last five years) is primarily responsible for the lack of creation of remunerative and decent 
employment. As regards manufacturing, the duality between the large, mainly formal, and documented 
part of the economy and the small and household, mainly informal, and undocumented economy has been 
accentuated. The more rapid growth of the latter has been driven by the ready availability of unskilled 
labour, resulting in the creation of low-quality and low-productivity jobs in poor working conditions. The 
declining writ of the state, together with increasing corruption and lack of transparency, has also drawn 
in firms that claim to be informal but which, for all practical purposes, fall in the legal preview of being 
recognised as formal.  
The employment-generating capacity of the large-scale manufacturing sector has been seriously curtailed 
by the high and increasing capital intensity of production, driven mainly by the adoption of modern 
technology. However, even for the relatively limited number of jobs created, the sector’s potential to 
generate better and decent jobs has been seriously impaired. The declining bargaining position of workers, 
widespread hiring of contract workers in place of regular employees, governments’ indifference to 
upholding existing labour laws, the absence of labour inspection, and low social protection coverage have 
all contributed to poor-quality jobs being created even in the organised sector. The presence of a small-
scale, mainly informal, and undocumented sector and the large pool of available unskilled labour at low 
wages act as a dampener on the creation of better and decent jobs in the large-scale manufacturing sector. 
In this sense, Pakistan may have reverted to the Lewisian stage of economic development.  
The major challenge is to reverse this trend. This will require not just the revival of high economic growth 
but strong and vibrant labour market institutions to translate this growth into decent jobs. 
The study is organised as follows: 
In Part I, we start by analysing the structure and functioning of the labour market in Pakistan, 
and recent employment and labour market developments in the last decade (2000–12) to bring 
out its major challenges, especially in creating more and better job opportunities and 
overcoming the discrimination and social exclusion faced by women and vulnerable groups.  
In Part II, we review some important studies conducted to analyse employment and labour 
market developments as they have unfolded, including the role of the manufacturing sector in 
job generation. 
In Part III, we analyse the major drivers of economic growth and employment generation in the 
last three decades (1980–2010) in terms of sectors and trends in total factor productivity (TFP). 
We conduct a separate decomposition exercise covering the more recent period 2000–10 to 
explain the sectoral pattern of growth and its employment and productivity intensity. We also 
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examine profitability trends for these years to determine whether demand constraints have 
hindered investment. 
Part IV concentrates on the role of the manufacturing sector in generating jobs in the economy; 
we review the sector’s performance since the 1960s, including that of large- and small-scale 
manufacturing. The reasons for the very limited role of large-scale manufacturing in 
contributing to the creation of more and better jobs are then critically analysed.  
In Part V, we identify two subsectors of manufacturing—engineering, and within it the 
automotive sector and garments sector—that have considerable potential for generating both 
output growth and decent employment opportunities if appropriate support policies were to be 
put in place through social dialogue and tripartite discussions. 
In Part VI, we identify policies that we deem essential to reviving growth in manufacturing as 
well as generating decent jobs: these cover macro, trade, and sectoral policies and labour market 
reforms, including the critical role of well-functioning representative labour market institutions 
that could foster political commitment to social justice. 
Part I 
The Structure and Functioning of the Labour Market in Pakistan 
In analysing labour market developments in Pakistan, a number of key demand, supply, 
structural, and institutional factors need to be kept in mind—these have an important impact on 
labour market outcomes as reflected in key labour market indicators. 
Table 1: Sectoral composition of GDP and labour force (percent) 
Sector 
GDP Labour force (10 years and above) 
1990/91 1999/2000 2009/10 1990/91 1999/2000 2009/10 
Agriculture 25.7 25.9 21.2 47.5 48.4 45.0 
Industry 25.8 23.3 26.4 19.8 18.0 20.9 
Manufacturing 17.5 14.7 18.6 12.2 11.5 13.2 
Services 48.6 50.7 52.4 32.8 33.6 34.1 
Source: Pakistan Economic Survey and Labour Force Survey (various issues). 
The first is that, at the time of independence in 1947, the country was primarily agricultural and 
most industry in adjoining regions that were dependent on its raw materials were located in 
India. When, just a few years after independence, trade between the two countries almost came 
to a halt due to rising tensions, Pakistan embarked on a process of rapid import-substitution 
industrialization behind protective barriers. This resulted in a major shift in labour from 
agriculture to industry—mainly manufacturing—together with rapid urbanisation. This 
structural transformation of the economy continued during the 1950s and 1960s but, 
subsequently, the labour absorption capacity of the manufacturing sector decreased; in 
subsequent decades, its share fluctuated but did not rise significantly. In 2009/10, it accounted 
for 13.2 percent of the total labour force while industry as a whole accounted for around 21 
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percent (Table 1). There has been a corresponding increase in the share of services, which now 
account for 35 percent of the labour force while agriculture is still the largest employer at 40 
percent. 
The second factor has been the very high growth rate of population at almost 3 percent a year 
from the 1960s till the 1980s, when it started to slow down but remained high; at present, it is an 
estimated 2.1 percent. This has led to a high growth rate of the labour force at over 3 percent in 
the last three decades. The demographic transition that started in the 1990s with a decline in the 
dependency ratio and corresponding youth bulge is expected to continue till 2030.  
The high growth rate of the labour force and low incomes, and the fact that there is no wide-
scale effective social protection available, mean that almost all entrants into the labour market 
have to work for a living. This means that the supply of labour is adjusted in the labour market. 
Only a severe shock or a sudden and sustained decline in the economy will lead to a significant 
rise in unemployment rates. Estimates of employment elasticity, widely used in the literature, 
which show the ratio of the growth of employment to growth in output or value-added can, 
therefore, be very misleading. 
Third, the growth of the Pakistan economy is characterised by a stop-go cycle with periods of 
high economic growth being followed by periods of low economic growth. The movement of 
key employment, poverty, and labour market indicators have not always been in line with these 
indicators, which has resulted in considerable controversy, especially on poverty movements 
over the economic cycle. 
The fourth has been the very low female participation rate, as conventionally measured. 
Though there has been some improvement in recent years—partly due to increasing female 
educational levels, albeit from a very low base—the rate is still very low. 
Fifth, a very large proportion of the nonagricultural labour force, estimated to be as high as 70 
percent, is employed in the so-called informal sector of the economy, which is characterised by 
low wages, low productivity, and very poor and hazardous working conditions.  
Sixth, labour market institutions, including those representing workers, have weakened 
considerably—a reflection of the strong pro-market private sector-led policies adopted by 
successive governments since the 1990s (“deregulation–privatisation–liberalisation”) as well as 
the fact that Pakistan has been under an International Monetary Fund (IMF) programme with 
strong conditionalities to restore macro-stability and revive private sector-led growth. These 
have all contributed to a strong bias against organised labour for the last 25 years.  
Finally, most of the official data on labour and employment are of uneven quality and need to 
be handled with considerable caution. Indeed, any analysis of the employment and labour 
market situation needs to be crafted with considerable finesse using, wherever possible, data 
from a number of sources to capture labour market developments. This also means that one has 
to be very careful when interpreting results from sophisticated economic models and 
econometric exercises based on this data.  
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Recent labour market developments and major challenges, 2000–13 
In analysing recent labour market developments, we cover the period 2000–13, which coincides 
with the period of General Pervez Musharraf’s military regime (2000–08) followed by the 
democratic Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) coalition government rule (2008–13). This period saw 
the economy move through a classical boom–bust cycle with an impressive burst of economic 
growth in 2002–07 followed by a sharp decline in economic growth and stagflation for the rest 
of the period (Figure 1).  
Figure 1 
 
Source: Pakistan Economic Survey (2011/12) for FY2000–FY2012; State Bank of Pakistan‘s Annual Report (2012) for 
FY2013. 
The strong growth revival under Musharraf’s rule that saw unemployment levels fall from a 
peak of 8.3 percent in the financial year (FY) 2002 to 5.2 percent in FY2008 was also 
accompanied by a fall in poverty as measured by the population living below the national 
poverty line (based on a caloric intake of 2,350 calories). This proportion fell from 34.5 percent 
in FY2001 to 22.3 percent in FY2006 and further to 17.2 percent in FY2008. Real wages, as 
measured for construction workers, also increased by around 50 percent in this period (Amjad, 
2012). 
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Figure 2 
 
Source: Pakistan Economic Survey (2011/12) for FY2000–FY2012; State Bank of Pakistan; Labour Force Survey 
(2012/13) for data on unemployment rate for FY2013. 
What happened to these key socioeconomic indicators during the period of deep stagflation that 
followed? The available evidence suggests that they were not as adversely affected as might 
have been expected. The unemployment rate rose from 5.2 percent in FY2008 to 6.2 percent in 
FY2013 and, surprisingly, poverty levels fell further to 12.4 percent in FY2011 as measured by 
the earlier indicators and surveys. Other evidence, such as the 2012 Pakistan Panel Household 
Survey (carried out by the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics), though not fully 
comparable, also shows that there was no major increase during the period of low growth and 
double-digit inflation. The real wages of agricultural workers increased though those of 
construction workers fell during this period. 
As expected, these results, especially the decline in poverty, have led to considerable 
controversy. Amjad (2012) has tried to address this issue by arguing that, despite the economic 
slowdown and high inflation, poverty and the labour market were favourably affected by (i) the 
almost twelve-fold increase in remittances from just over USD1.5 billion in FY2001 to around 
USD12 billion in FY2012 (or around 5 percent of GDP in the latter year); (ii) improved terms of 
trade in favour of agriculture as the PPP doubled the procurement price of wheat, the major 
agricultural crop, and other support prices; and (iii) a significantly large and vibrant 
undocumented economy. That this “resilience” of the Pakistan economy resulted in poverty 
levels not falling or only marginally declining is, however, strongly contested. Nonetheless, a 
recent study by the World Bank (2013) tends to back the view that poverty levels did not 
increase, at least based on data for the Punjab (60 percent of the population), which is seen to be 
more reliable than data for the other three provinces (Newman, 2013).  
Why has Pakistan not reaped the demographic dividend? 
A major thrust of this paper is that Pakistan’s continuing high growth rate of population at 
around 2.1 percent and a labour force variously estimated as growing at 3.0–3.5 percent acts as a 
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strong headwind against the country building up any real momentum towards high, 
sustainable, and inclusive growth 
Against this somewhat depressing scenario has been the welcome news that Pakistan is now 
passing through a demographic transition with much hope of an accompanying “demographic 
dividend”. Almost 20 years have passed since the advent of this demographic transition in the 
early or mid-1990s, and the question now is why Pakistan has not reaped the demographic 
dividend. Amjad (2013c) argues that, to benefit from such a dividend, the economy must grow 
at a fast enough rate to find productive employment for the youth bulge, i.e., the growing 
number of young people in the total population. Unfortunately, the overall growth trend has 
declined in the last 25 years. The second factor standing in the way of reaping the demographic 
dividend is the labour force’s low level of education and skills ( Table 2).  
Table 2: Distribution of labour force by level of education (among those aged 15–24) 
Year Illiterate < Primary Primary Middle Matric Intermediate BA+ Total 
1990/91 53.0 5.0 16.7 10.9 9.6 3.0 1.7 100.0 
2001/02 48.6 50.7 52.4 32.8 33.6 34.1 2.3 100.0 
2010/11 35.3 4.6 21.4 16.4 13.8 5.3 3.3 100.0 
Source: Labour Force Survey (various issues). 
Does the youth bulge and declining dependency ratio not in itself propel economic growth as 
earlier authors have argued and studies on India seem to suggest?4 While Pakistan’s economic 
performance does not support such causation, it could be argued that its economic resilience 
may well be because of its young entrants into the labour market and their growing share in the 
population as well as the labour force. Amjad (2013c) suggests that Pakistan, in view of its 
continuing low economic growth and lack of employment opportunities, may be reaping the 
demographic dividend through the manifold increase in remittances, which is caused partly by 
increasing overseas migration, mainly by young migrants, as well as an increase in their skill 
levels, including that of many professionals, engineers, and business managers.  
Such an explanation, however, needs more rigorous analysis. Even if true, it should not distract 
from the real challenge of taking advantage of this window of opportunity that the 
demographic transition has opened up and reaping the demographic dividend for the national 
economy. Amjad (2013c) details policies essential for this to happen both on the demand side—
primarily the revival of economic growth—and in the medium and long term, i.e., by increasing 
enrolment in primary and secondary education, especially for females, and instituting a 
demand-driven skills training system. 
                                                    
4 See Aiyar and Mody (2011) who argue, based on the growth performance of Indian states, that unlike Bloom and 
Canning (2004) they do not find the demographic dividend to be conditional on specific policies or the social 
environment. 
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Growth in the informal and undocumented economy 
That a large part of the urban economy is characterised as informal is well recognized in 
Pakistan as it is for most developing countries. Official data sources estimate that its share of 
nonagricultural employment has increased in recent years from an estimated 65 percent in 
1999/2000 to 73.5 percent in 2010/11 (Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, 2012). It has never been easy 
to define the informal economy, despite attempts, including by the International Labour 
Organization (ILO). In Pakistan’s case, though, the definition used to estimate the size and 
number employed in the informal sector—as enterprises employing fewer than ten workers 
together with all household enterprises owned and operated by own-account workers 
irrespective of size—makes it even more difficult to come up with precise estimates. Clearly, 
there could be firms employing fewer than ten workers that may be registered and so would fall 
in the bracket of the organised sector. That said, there is little doubt that the majority of workers 
in the nonagricultural economy are part of the informal economy and that it has grown in 
recent years. 
Essentially, informality should be viewed as a continuum: different enterprises have different 
characteristics of informality as well as the extent to which they deviate from the criteria for a 
formally registered firm. The question then is: why do enterprises prefer to remain informal? 
Based on findings from the World Bank’s enterprise surveys conducted in 2002 and 2007, 
Manes (2013) suggests that this is because regulations impose such high costs that “firms find it 
profitable to remain informal to avoid them” and that “basic business costs, such as that for 
taxes, labour and safety, are just too high” (p. 476). He goes on to argue that the costs to the firm 
of registering and becoming part of the formal structure are just not attractive enough (in terms 
of access to finance, contracts, land, etc.) and that unless this happens, such firms will have no 
incentive to conduct their business in the formal economy. 
This interpretation is perhaps too generous to firms that take the guise of informality in order to 
avoid labour laws and regulations (including those related to safety and conditions of work), 
avoid taxes and, in many cases, are also involved in theft or underpayment of bills for 
electricity, gas, and other utilities. It will always be “more profitable” to indulge in such 
activities, which cannot be simply condoned. The economic and social costs, especially for 
workers, are far too high. That said, it must also be kept in mind that firms prefer to remain 
informal not only to save costs and earn higher profits but also to avoid harassment by corrupt 
government officials. Based on the World Bank 2007 enterprise survey, Manes (2013) states that, 
”senior management in large firms spent on average 13 percent of their time dealing with 
regulations—almost three times what smaller firms spent (5 percent). Large firms met or were 
inspected by tax officials almost seven times a year compared to three times for small firms .... 
Only 6 percent of small firms noted that labour market regulations affected their decisions to 
hire and fire permanent workers compared to over four times that share of large firms .... 
Consequently, the informal sector has been estimated to be as large as 35–40 percent of the 
official economy” (p. 457). 
It should also be kept in mind that, as the country’s security and law and order situation has 
deteriorated, the “writ of the state” has been considerably eroded. This has also created 
conditions for enterprises to avoid rules and regulations on the one hand in the guise of 
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remaining informal and led to an increase in corruption and harassment by government 
functionaries on the other. 
It is also important to differentiate between enterprises that operate in the informal economy 
and those that are undocumented. The undocumented or “shadow” economy covers those 
economic activities that are not reflected in the officially recorded national income accounts and 
may include formal as well as informal enterprises. Additionally, economic activity being 
undertaken in the undocumented sector of the economy must not be confused with the illegal 
economy, which is not, in any case, included or covered in the official statistics. The 
undocumented economy grows for a number of reasons, including the underreporting of sales, 
poor coverage by official data-gathering agencies, or just because many firms choose to ignore 
or do not provide the required information even though they are legally bound to do so. It thus 
becomes more difficult to capture the size and dynamics of the national economy. For the 
purpose of this study, this is especially true of the manufacturing sector, both large-scale and 
small-scale, as its contribution to GDP is significantly underestimated.5 We take up this issue in 
greater detail in our analysis of the manufacturing sector. 
Female participation in the labour market 
A positive development in recent years has been the significant rise in the female labour force 
participation rate. However, the very low level from which it has risen and the fact that the 
absolute low level remains dismal also needs to be put into perspective. 
The ratio of female employment to the working-age population increased from around 11 
percent in 1990/91 to 21 percent in 2010/11. The major part of this increase took place during 
2001/02 to 2005/06—the years of economic recovery and high growth—after which the rate of 
increase has slowed down. One reason for this increase is that males moved from agriculture to 
higher-wage nonagriculture employment and were replaced by the female members of the 
household—mainly young women—primarily in the raising of livestock. This also explains the 
increase in female employment in the category of unpaid family workers and the declining 
share of female salaried workers in total female employment from 33.1 percent in 1999/2000 to 
14.5 percent in 2009/10, after which it increased marginally to 16.6 percent. 
The low participation rate of females in the labour market in Pakistan has been an area of 
considerable research and debate, ranging from arguments that women’s participation in 
activities such as household work is not measured and that other farm and related work is not 
sufficiently captured, to the argument that cultural and other factors prevent them from seeking 
work outside the household. A study conducted jointly by the ILO and the Ministry of Labour 
and Manpower (2009) in Faisalabad district, a prosperous region in Punjab, provides some 
interesting insights. The major reason given by females aged 15–29 for not entering the labour 
market was family or personal responsibilities (67 percent). Of those not working, only 28 
percent were enrolled in education or formal training compared to 91 percent of nonworking 
                                                    
5 This is, for example, reflected in the fact that the last Census of Manufacturing Industries was conducted in 2005/06 
and that the results of the most recent census (2011/12) have been delayed simply because firms, especially in the 
province of Sindh, have just not filled and returned the questionnaire sent to them. 
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males in this age group. This reflects the high gender gap in secondary and tertiary education. 
The lack of employment opportunities is, therefore, not the major reason for females not 
entering the labour market as much as it is the broader issue of “family or personal” 
responsibilities, which clearly covers a wide range of sociocultural and socioeconomic issues 
besides just household work and raising a family. 
Is the increasing share of females in higher and secondary education going to make some 
difference to female participation in the labour market? There are growing signs of women 
working in the retail sector in major cities or starting their own businesses, mostly run from 
their homes, to cater to the increasing demand of a rising middle class for readymade garments 
and food items. Women are also far more visible in government and public sector offices and 
departments as well as in managerial positions. Trained female nurses are also finding 
employment in the Gulf and neighbouring Middle East countries. However, this issue has not 
yet been empirically investigated. 
An important implication of the low participation rate of females in the labour market, as 
reflected in the overall low ratio of employment to working-age population, is that each 
working man and woman still had to provide for nearly two nonworking persons in 2010. This 
dependency ratio is much higher than the South Asian average and will remain high in the 
absence of a substantial increase in female participation rates. It also strengthens the argument 
that Pakistan cannot reap the demographic dividend if those of working age do not enter the 
working-age population besides the lack of job opportunities for those who do. 
Labour market institutions: The weakening bargaining strength of workers 
Sustained productivity growth allows people’s living conditions to improve over time. 
However, for this to happen, two further conditions need to be met. The first is that growth in 
productivity should be accompanied by an increase in employment—given the rapid growth of 
the labour force—otherwise it will result in higher unemployment and poverty. The second is 
that, while productivity growth may be a necessary condition for improvements in living 
conditions, it is not in itself a sufficient one. Ensuring that the gains in productivity translate 
into higher wages and better living conditions depends critically on the bargaining position of 
workers, especially in the manufacturing sector, which is the focus of this paper. However, it is 
important to maintain a balance between the creation of more jobs and better jobs in an 
economy with a high growth rate of the labour force. This brings into focus the need for a well 
functioning labour market and labour market institutions that ensure both efficient and 
equitable labour market outcomes. 
This section briefly reviews the evidence on the behaviour of real wages in the large-scale 
manufacturing sector, wage differentials between the formal and informal economy, the 
coverage of social protection, and the membership of registered trade unions in Pakistan. 
Table 3 shows that average real wages in the large-scale manufacturing sector barely increased 
during the 1990s and rose by about 7 percent during the boom years between FY2003 and 2007. 
Data are not available for recent years but, given the very high food inflation rate (around 80 
percent between FY2008 and FY2011), average real wages in large-scale manufacturing 
probably declined.  
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Table 3: Average daily employment and yearly real wages (at 2000/01 prices) in large-scale 
manufacturing (all industry categories) 
 1990/91 1995/96 2000/01 2005/06 
Number of reporting establishments 4,792 4,474 4,528 6,417 
Average daily employment (all employees) 622,234 561,821 689,692 941,285 
Average daily employment (production workers) 492,301 440,276 560,905 751,586 
Nonproduction workers 129,933 121,645 128,787 185,677 
Average real wages per year (all employees) 98,760 102,070 99,190 106,861 
Average real wages per year (production workers) 87,670 91,430 86,920 93,535 
Average real wages per year (nonproduction workers) 140,770 140,500 152,610 143,352 
Source: Census of Manufacturing Industries (CMI) as reported in Irfan (2008) till 2000/01 and CMI 2005/06 for that 
year. 
Unfortunately, data are not available on the large majority of workers engaged in 
manufacturing in the small-scale and informal economy. However, at least during the 1990s, 
with little or no increase in large-scale manufacturing employment, average real wages in the 
small-scale and informal economy probably declined. In all probability, following the short-
lived resurgence in economic growth during FY2003–FY2007, real wages declined post-2008 in 
the small-scale and informal economy. 
Table 4 reflects the poor bargaining position of workers in the informal economy and 
discrimination in the labour market against females. Data for 2003/04 (Irfan, 2008) show that 
monthly wages for regular employees were 65 percent higher than for those in the informal 
economy. Monthly wages for female regular employees were almost 100 percent less than that 
of their male counterparts in the formal economy, with a similar differential in the informal 
economy. Even in the case of government regular employees, females’ monthly wages were, on 
average, less than 20 percent that of males. This shows that there were far fewer women in 
higher grades/positions, reflecting their lower average wage. 
Table 4: Monthly wages of regular and all wage employees by type of enterprise and sex, 
2003/04 
Type of enterprise by 
sex 
Monthly wages (PRs) 
Wage 
ratio 
(regular 
to all) 
Distribution of 
employees (%) Regular 
employees 
(%) 
Wage ratio (all to 
regular) 
All 
employees 
Regular 
employees Regular All Rural Urban 
Both 
sexes 
Government  6,585 6,656 1.01 40.40 21.0 96.70 0.75 0.75 
Formal 4,501 5,596 1.24 28.92 23.8 61.10 0.51 0.52 
Informal 2,875 3,027 1.05 30.92 55.2 28.70 0.82 0.82 
 Total 4,045 5,237 1.29 100.00 100.0 52.05 0.69 0.72 
Male Government  6,719 6,794 1.01 39.50 21.4 96.40 0.77 0.71 
Formal 4,939 5,868 1.18 29.30 23.4 65.30 0.55 0.51 
Informal 3,055 3,187 1.04 31.00 55.2 29.20 0.84 0.82 
 Total 4,278 5,401 1.26 100.00 100.0 39.90 0.52 0.50 
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Female Government  5,663 5,722 1.01 47.40 19.3 98.00 0.59 0.61 
Formal 2,111 3,022 1.43 25.40 26.6 38.00 0.49 0.54 
Informal 1,737 1,540 0.89 27.10 54.1 20.00 0.73 0.59 
 Total 2,595 3,900 1.50 100.00 100.0    
Source: Irfan (2008): Tabulations based on Labour Force Survey data. 
What of the trends in social protection? Post-2008, there has been a substantial, almost fivefold, 
increase in expenditures on social protection and social safety nets under the PPP government, 
from 0.16 percent of GDP in 2008/09 to 0.79 percent in 2012/13, yet it is difficult to gauge, based 
on the existing data, if this increase also benefited workers in the manufacturing sector (Malik & 
Pop, 2013).  
In large-scale manufacturing, an estimated two-thirds of the labour force serve as contract 
labour and therefore enjoy no social protection (Jamal, 2010). The total number of workers 
covered by different social protection schemes is around 6.1 million or around 10 percent of the 
labour force. The Employers Old Age Benefit Insurance (EOBI) scheme in July 2013 covered just 
over 3 million workers in both industrial and commercial enterprises (EOBI website). This is 
around 5 percent of the total labour force. The total number of beneficiaries between July 2012 
and December 2012 was 373,433, which is 25 percent higher than the figure for the 
corresponding period in 2011 (Pakistan Economic Survey for 2012/13). 
It is possible that those in small-scale and household manufacturing may be benefitting from 
social assistance programs, including the direct income Benazir Income Support Programme 
(BISP). The BISP was launched in 2008 to cover 7 million households and provides a monthly 
PRs1,000 stipend for the female heads of qualifying households (identified through a score 
card). It is not, however, possible to identify which households and workers in manufacturing 
may be benefitting from this scheme. Nonetheless, based on the evidence, we can conclude that 
a small part of those who work in manufacturing are covered by social security or social 
assistance programmes. 
The number of workers who are members of trade unions could be one measure of workers’ 
bargaining strength in negotiating with employers and the government for improved wages 
and better working conditions. It is difficult to obtain reliable data because it is possible that 
many registered trade unions claim a higher number of workers as members than actually exist 
and, more importantly, as active members who participate in trade union activities. 
Table 5, which is based on official sources, suggests that the numbers have fluctuated since 
1990, but that an estimated 450,000 workers were registered as members of trade unions in 2005. 
This may be on the high side but it is still only 1 percent of the labour force and around 4 
percent of the nonagricultural labour force. 
It is not just in terms of numbers that the bargaining position of workers has declined. Since the 
1990s, there has been a marked shift towards pro-market private sector-led growth with a 
strong bias against organised labour. The Labour Policy 2002 severely curtailed workers’ 
fundamental rights of association and collective bargaining. Even though it has been replaced 
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by the more balanced Labour Policy 2010, which is committed to upholding international 
labour standards, in practice state institutions are indifferent to upholding existing labour laws. 
What about the impact of minimum wages, which the government has announced at different 
intervals and especially during the last ten years? Again, recent data are not available but Irfan 
(2008) estimates that, in 2003/04, around 25 percent of all wage earners were paid less than the 
minimum wage and that the number was much higher for nonregular workers (39.2 percent) 
than for regular workers (14.1 percent). Given that two-thirds of workers in large-scale 
manufacturing are contract workers and, therefore, fall into the category of nonregular workers, 
a very high proportion of these worked below the minimum wage.  
Table 5: Trade union membership and industrial disputes, 1990–2008 
Year 
Union membership Industrial disputes 
Total 
registered 
trade unions 
Total number of 
registered trade 
unions reporting 
Membership 
of reporting 
unions 
Number of 
disputes 
Number of 
workers 
involved 
Number of 
person-
days lost 
1990 7,080 1,763 359,633 99 65,918 186,726 
1991 7,027 1,441 288,803 94 116,306 582,694 
1992 7,185 1,834 415,768 40 73,357 398,128 
1993 - 1,685 374,731 28 17,133 404,564 
1994 7,273 1,718 325,677 25 15,434 341,196 
1995 7,426 1,718 337,617 24 10,919 63,626 
1996 7,349 1,594 293,530 30 18,566 203,323 
1997 7,355 1,534 296,257 30 7,865 283,342 
1998 7,356 1,478 305,340 20 6,097 122,519 
1999 7,382 1,493 301,164 6 3,937 182,151 
2000 NA 1,376 301,332 4 225 667 
2001 NA 1,260 275,646 4 711 7,078 
2002 NA 1,201 247,539 4 516 12,160 
2003 7,183 2,493 455,304 18 8,189 47,719 
2004 7,104 2,422 444,795 15 8,724 95,124 
2005 7,129 2,428 431,542 19 10,177 102,932 
2006 7,029 2,405 NA 17 7,988 85,751 
2007 7,051 2,404 NA 21 11,245 102,149 
2008 6,793 1,209 NA 17 5,924 26,668 
Source: Pakistan Statistical Year Book (various issues) as cited in Irfan (2008) till 2006 and for subsequent years based 
on the same source. 
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Part II 
A Review of the Literature 
We start with the seminal study conducted by the ILO’s Asian Regional Team for Employment 
Promotion (ARTEP) titled “Employment and structural change in Pakistan: Issues for the 
Eighties” (ILO/ARTEP, 1983), which was jointly written by a team comprising ILO specialists 
and leading economists from the academia in Pakistan.6 It was also perhaps the first study of its 
kind that was carried out specifically at the request of the Planning Commission to serve as an 
input to the formulation of Pakistan’s Sixth Five-Year Plan (1983–88).7  
The report’s key contribution was that it analysed important structural changes that had taken 
place in the agriculture and manufacturing sectors during the 1960s and 1970s and which 
directly affected labour absorption and employment relations in these two sectors. After 
reviewing the overall employment and labour market situation, the report separately analysed: 
(i) changes in the agrarian structure and their implication for the demand for labour, (ii) the 
impact of past and existing industrial policies on employment generation for the large and 
small-scale manufacturing sectors, and (iii) overseas migration and its impact on the domestic 
labour market. Based on this analysis and projections of labour supply over the Sixth Plan 
period 1983–88, it made the following specific policy recommendations: 
 In the 1960s, far-reaching changes had taken place in Pakistan’s agrarian structure as a 
result of the “green revolution” and substantial increases in crop productivity had led 
large landowners to resume land from tenant farmers. As a result, the size structure of 
landholdings had polarized further between large and small farms, together with a 
significant increase in landless labour. It was, therefore, important to ensure that labour 
absorption into agriculture was not further eroded. The report recommended (i) giving 
priority to increasing cropping intensity, productivity, and labour-intensive cropping 
patterns through increased inputs, especially of fertilizer and water; and (ii) moving to 
global prices as the basis for setting domestic prices as the former favoured labour-
intensive crops such as cotton and rice. It also argued strongly against labour-displacing 
mechanisation and recommended that subsidised credit should not be provided for such 
machinery. Moreover, it argued, adopting a realistic foreign exchange rate instead of an 
overvalued exchange rate was preferable because the latter favoured the import of 
capital-intensive machinery (most agricultural machinery at that time was imported). 
 The report attributed the extremely disappointing performance of large-scale 
manufacturing in generating additional employment mainly to economic policies that 
subsidised the use of imported machinery and to the high capital intensity of imported 
capital goods. It set out a number of policies that would remove the existing policy bias 
against small-scale manufacturing. These focused on the exchange rate, credit, and tariff 
regimes, given their potential for creating low-cost jobs in relation to the much higher 
                                                    
6 The team included Naved Hamid, Akmal Hussain, Ijaz Nabi, Omar Asghar Khan, Vaqar Ahmed, and Rashid 
Amjad (who also acted as coordinator of the study and put the report together). 
7 The employment chapter in the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1983–88) was based on the ILO/ARTEP (1983) study. 
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costs associated with large-scale manufacturing as well as being efficient users of capital 
in terms of high value-added. 
 Based on a cost-benefit analysis of the substantial labour migration that had taken 
place—mainly to the Middle East in the 1970s—the report recommended that Pakistan’s 
comparative advantage lay in sending abroad semi- and unskilled workers rather than 
highly skilled workers or professionals. It argued that substantial public resources had 
been invested in the latter and that sending this category abroad was also resulting in 
domestic shortages. It recommended, somewhat optimistically, that professionals going 
abroad should be asked to pay back part of the cost of their subsidised professional 
studies, especially those who had studied on overseas scholarships funded by the 
government. 
 Analyzing in depth the most recent surveys of small and household manufacturing 
industries, the report showed that the small-scale sector had grown very rapidly at over 
8 percent per annum in the 1970s, and that the growth of some industries, such as 
engineering goods and plastics, had been driven by remittances, especially in rural 
areas. This had led to new and rising demand for consumer durables such as washing 
machines and refrigerators as well as other consumer goods such as plastic containers 
and utensils. 
 Given the large numbers of skilled and semiskilled workers going abroad, the report 
recommended a number of measures to increase the supply of skills such as by 
encouraging formal sector firms to hire apprentices and setting up skills training 
institutions in the public sector. 
The thrust of the report was that, during the Sixth Plan 1983–88 period, the highest priority 
should be given to (i) employment generation, given the projected high growth of the labour 
force at over 3 percent; and (ii) reducing the existing high levels of poverty, given that nearly 
one-third of all households were below the poverty line. It warned the government against 
being lulled into inaction by the temporary easing of the labour market situation as a result of 
the large migration overseas, especially to the Middle East.  
As a follow-up to this report, the ILO/ARTEP undertook another study (1986), again at the 
request of the Planning Commission, as a mid-term review of the employment and labour 
market situation. The study evaluated the extent to which the recommended policies had been 
implemented and determined what further measures were needed on the basis of this review. 
In addition to the earlier sectors covered, including overseas migration, the report also analysed 
employment trends in the public sector and the role of the construction sector in stimulating 
employment, given its forward and backward linkages with the rest of the economy. The report 
gauged the functioning of the urban and rural labour markets, especially wages and incomes, as 
well as trends in poverty levels. It emphasised the need for policies that could overcome the 
skills constraint and reduce skill mismatch in the economy. The report also made a strong case 
for strengthening the institutional machinery for employment and human resource planning 
and monitoring, including in the Planning Commission, for improving the collection of data on 
labour market indicators, and for setting up a comprehensive labour market information 
system. 
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The ILO/ARTEP’s (1986) review of the first two years of the Sixth Plan period showed a 
dramatic slowdown in overseas migration to the Middle East and, therefore, accentuating 
pressures on the labour market. Realising the gravity of the situation, the new government of 
Prime Minister Junejo set up the National Manpower Commission in August 1987, which 
included senior government planners and representatives of the private sector and educational 
institutions. The commission was tasked with preparing a comprehensive plan for human 
resource development in the country and providing initial inputs for the Seventh Five-Year Plan 
(1988–93). Its terms of reference included: (i) determining the size and dimensions of the 
problem of unemployment and recommending both short- and long-term policies to deal with 
it; (ii) examining the imbalance between general education and vocational training and 
education to help minimise the wastage of resources and effectively respond to employment 
and skills demand in a cost-effective manner; (iii) suggesting measures to provide employment 
to professionals, including doctors and engineers; (iv) considering the special problems arising 
from the emigration of Pakistani workers and return migrants and suggesting measures to 
promote migration overseas as well as those for returning workers; and (v) examining the 
special problems of women and suggesting measures, including training and services to enlarge 
and strengthen the participation of women in economic and other national activities.  
As many as seven technical committees were set up to analyse these issues. At the same time, in 
2008, an ILO/UNDP/Planning Division project was started to support the work of the National 
Manpower Commission and to provide inputs to the formulation of the Seventh Five-Year Plan. 
This project published a total of 14 reports including a proposed strategy for employment and 
human resource development in Pakistan (Cameron & Irfan, 1990). 
Given the importance the government was according to employment issues in the late 1980s, 
the World Bank (1989) also undertook a study to examine Pakistan’s employment issues and 
prospects. It took as its point of departure the two ILO reports (ILO/ARTEP, 1983, 1986) as well 
as a seven-volume report by the ILO/ARTEP (1987) on the impact of out- and return-migration 
on domestic employment in Pakistan. 
To some extent, the World Bank (1989) played down the government’s concerns that stemmed 
from the fear of return migration from the Middle East as well as rising unemployment among 
professionals, especially doctors and engineers. It argued that return migrants would, at best, 
add to about 5 percent of the increase in the labour force and that they were, in any case, 
economically better off and usually more skilled than the rest of the population. Additionally, 
doctors and engineers came from middle-class family backgrounds though the report admitted 
that they could pose socioeconomic and even political problems for the government if they 
resorted to street unrest. While recognising that major structural changes had taken place in the 
rural economy following the green revolution and resumption of land from tenants by middle-
size and large landowners, the World Bank argued that these were not necessarily a negative 
development if they resulted in the rising average productivity of labour. Its major concern was 
Pakistan’s continuing high population growth rate, which had resulted in the high growth of 
both the labour force at over 3 percent and of its youth component. The report also showed that 
large-scale manufacturing employment had stagnated at half a million since the early 1970s and 
that most of the growth in employment in manufacturing had taken place in small-scale, 
informal, and household manufacturing. 
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An important contribution of the report was that, unlike the earlier reports, it analysed the 
impact of existing government regulations and labour laws on different sizes of firms. The very 
large firms and government enterprises, it argued, were subject to stringent labour legislation. 
Medium as well as small enterprises, on the other hand, were subject to labour regulations but 
managed to circumvent most labour laws while simultaneously benefitting from protective 
legislation (e.g., tax holidays, tariff protection). The third category at the extreme consisted of 
wholly unregulated enterprises that operated outside the purview of labour laws and generally 
did not receive any benefits from the government. Such firms could be affected to varying 
extents by government policies, especially as related to the tariff and exchange rate regime. The 
report also pointed out that these small-scale manufacturing firms and household enterprises 
had surpassed large-scale formal enterprises—as shown by the ILO/ARTEP (1983)—in both 
labour absorption and output growth. As a result of the increased demand for labour rather 
than wage erosion in this sector, real wages had in fact increased. 
These findings as well as its analysis of the rural labour market led the World Bank (1989) to 
conclude that, given the general wage flexibility in response to changes in labour supply and 
demand and corresponding wage movements between sectors, labour markets in Pakistan were 
competitive and linked. The report went on to state that, “there is no distinct or parallel labour market 
in Pakistan, one for the formal and the other for the informal sector but a continuum of markets” (p. v). 
The World Bank did, however, seriously contend that extending labour laws to small-scale and 
informal enterprises would adversely affect their growth, which had been extremely high, at 
over 8 percent, between the late 1970s and mid-1980s. 
Overall, the studies conducted in the 1980s by the ILO and the World Bank agreed that, in the 
medium and long term, Pakistan faced the serious challenge of finding employment for its fast-
growing workforce. These reports emphasised the supply side in improving the dismal 
education and skill levels of the workforce and demand-side measures that would encourage 
the growth of small-scale and informal manufacturing as well as farm and off-farm 
employment. The ILO also placed an emphasis on sectors that could stimulate employment 
growth in the short term, especially construction and within it housing, given their high 
forward and backward linkages with the rest of the economy. A study by Godfrey (1986) for the 
ILO made a strong case for the housing sector and for encouraging labour-intensive exports as a 
major driver of employment generation by dismantling the anti-export bias in government 
policies and investing in skills development. 
Employment-based poverty reduction strategy for decent work in Pakistan 
In order to encourage national ownership of developments plans and policies and to help erase 
the general impression that these were dictated by major donors, the World Bank launched the 
framing of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) as a prerequisite for developing 
countries applying for grants, loans, and debt rescheduling. At around the same time, the ILO, 
under a new director-general who took over in 1999, extended its focus on the creation of more 
jobs to the concept of decent work, which entailed rights at work, remunerative and productive 
employment, social protection, and a voice at work. The emphasis on employment and jobs 
thus shifted from more work to better and decent work, the creation of which would also help 
reduce poverty and overcome discrimination and social exclusion. 
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Working closely with the Planning Commission and the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), the ILO undertook a number of studies starting in 2001 (see ILO, Planning 
Commission, & UNDP, 2004) to develop policies for poverty reduction through the generation 
of employment opportunities that would result in decent work. An important objective of these 
studies was to help incorporate decent work into the PRSP-I—then under preparation by the 
Ministry of Finance—as well as the Medium-Term Budgetary Framework (as the development 
plan was renamed) being prepared by the Planning Commission for the period 2005–10. The 
initiative was also timely: for the past three years, the economy had been under a severe IMF 
stabilisation programme to restore macroeconomic stability, which had resulted in rising 
poverty and unemployment. 
The major studies undertaken related to employment generation policies for poverty reduction, 
the relationship between the functioning of the labour market and poverty, overseas migration, 
and social protection.  
An important contribution to this work was Gazdar’s (2004) study, which argued that, in 
framing anti-poverty policies, it was necessary to analyse the structural factors mediating poor 
people’s access to labour markets and job opportunities. To quote, “Anti-poverty policy ought 
to pay greater attention to structural changes which may lead to improved market conditions of 
the poor. In other words, a poverty reduction policy might be concerned not only with overall 
growth and employment generation, but also with institutional change” (p. 169). 
More specifically, in the context of the organised sector, Gazdar (2004) questioned the prevalent 
orthodoxy that the main source of labour market friction lies in public sector over-employment, 
rigid labour regulation, or restrictive practices on the part of unions. His argument was that an 
analysis of labour market functioning would show that there are “socially driven” labour 
market frictions that are as harmful, if not more, as any rigidities imposed by government 
regulations or trade unions: “In other words, even in the absence of public regulation and union 
activity, the labour market is likely to be uncompetitive, ‘unfree’, and unequal” (p. 169). 
As regards the organised manufacturing sector, he analysed the increasing shift towards 
contract work both within and outside the factory premises. Under this contractor or thekedar 
system, there is no direct contract between the worker and the management, and all 
transactions relating to work, pay, or other conditions are mediated through the thekedar. The 
system reduces costs for enterprises by circumventing labour regulations, social security 
obligations, wage policy, and the possibility of collective bargaining. By allowing this shift, 
fluctuations in economic activity could be seen to make labour markets more flexible and 
reduce labour rigidities. These advantages, of course, had to be weighed against the advantages 
of having a regular long-term factory employee, which would ensure a reliable and skilled 
workforce. Although Gazdar (2004) pointed out the need for more in-depth study of these 
institutional arrangements, he concluded that, “Rather than resembling competitive market 
conditions, [it] is premised on monopsonistic market conditions for employers, whereas 
workers are unable to realize the premium on their skills, knowledge of the sector, and 
reputation. … Moreover, the institutionalisation of the thekedar system leads to a particular 
form of work organisation that may not be conducive to firm expansion and technological 
innovation” (p. 180). 
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Pakistan’s labour market: Regulation, job creation, and skills formation in the manufacturing 
sector 
An opposite view arguing for much greater labour market flexibility to encourage faster job 
creation and skills formation in manufacturing was not long in coming. As the Musharraf 
government pressed on with a strong pro-private sector-led growth strategy and started what 
became known as the second-generation reforms, the World Bank (2006) undertook a detailed 
study of the manufacturing sector to improve the investment climate by suggesting reforms in 
labour laws and institutions, the vocational training system, social security, and welfare 
programs. The study, which was undertaken for the Ministry of Industries, Production, and 
Special Initiatives and the Ministry of Labour and Manpower, examined two critical constraints 
to the investment climate—labour regulation and the skills gap—so as to improve both 
employment outcomes and industrial productivity. 
Drawing on results from an Investment Climate Survey of nearly 1,000 mainly manufacturing 
businesses in eight industries during 2002, the World Bank (2006) concluded that labour 
regulation in Pakistan was excessive by international standards. The existing labour laws and 
regulations had raised the cost of long-term employment relations so high that the private 
sector was not creating good-quality jobs as it should nor was it helping to finance the training 
needed to train the industrial workforce to compete in global markets. The basis of the report’s 
international comparison of excessive labour market regulation was, “ironically”, as the World 
Bank put it, “that the share of temporary workers in Pakistan businesses is one of the highest by 
any international standard, standing at 36 percent against, for example, 15 percent in India and 
3 percent in Bangladesh” (p. iv). This excessive labour regulation had led to very low 
employment generation, i.e., output elasticity of employment, and had it not been for the 
recourse to hiring contract labour, the elasticity would have been even lower. The study 
recognised that temporary employment undermined the incentives for workers and for firms to 
participate in or sponsor on-the-job skills formation; this was one reason that firms reported 
skill shortages and only 15 percent sponsored such training.  
To “fully capitalise” on the impressive ongoing labour reform process, the report therefore 
recommended reforms in labour regulation that would reduce firing and hiring costs as well as 
the costs of complying with such legislation. It proposed redundancy as a legitimate ground for 
dismissal, removing time limits on labour contracts (which were higher in Pakistan than in 
other South Asian countries), and reducing compliance costs by simplifying inspection schemes, 
working condition reforms, and mechanisms for the collection of social security contracts.  
On reforms in the vocational training system, the report pointed out that the existing system 
suffered from excessive fragmentation, quality, scale, and lack of private sector ownership. It 
rightly stressed that, given its resource constraints, Pakistan needed to concentrate on access to 
primary and intermediate general education and reduce dropout rates. It also argued against 
earlier attempts to introduce vocational education in intermediate schools and a matriculation 
tech-stream at the secondary level. Finally, it recommended improving the working of the 
newly set-up National Vocational and Technical Education Commission (NAVTEC), offering 
on-the-job training, and expanding the currently very restricted internship programmes offered 
by large enterprises. 
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On social security, the report recommended the meaningful representation of workers and 
suggested that employers provide external control over the allocation of funds and the type of 
services offered to help improve governance. It also argued for expanding coverage but only 
after undertaking reforms that ensured high-quality services for covered workers and at a 
reasonable cost to employers. 
It is important to note that the World Bank (2006) report made no mention of international 
labour standards or the fact that the Industrial Relations Ordinance 2002, which had been 
adopted without tripartite consensus, had been subject to strictures by the independent 
Committee of Experts set up by the ILO (the ordinance curtailed workers’ rights of freedom of 
association and collective bargaining). The report also made no mention of the strictures on 
labour inspection policies being followed by the government or of trade unions even as labour 
market institutions. 
It would need some investigation to see if any of the report’s recommendations on increasing 
labour market flexibility were seriously considered or incorporated in existing labour market 
regulations. Suffice to say, most studies and, importantly, most employers did not find the 
existing labour legislation a major—leave aside binding—constraint on either the investment 
climate or increasing output. Indeed, more recent surveys conducted by the World Bank (see 
Manes, 2013) have confirmed that this was the case. The labour market was already sufficiently 
flexible and the fact that most large enterprises relied on contract workers showed not so much 
that the labour regulatory framework was restrictive but that it was neither effective nor being 
seriously implemented. In this sense, the earlier World Bank (1989) report had captured much 
better the reality of the functioning of the labour market, as had the earlier ILO reports. The 
latter had also concentrated on embedding employment into the government’s development 
plans and strategies and identified sectors and investments that could result in more productive 
and higher levels of employment. 
Finding the path to job-enhancing growth 
The World Bank must be given credit for realising in recent years—including through constant 
prodding by the ILO—that the real issue is not of increasing labour market flexibility in 
developing countries. Except for a few sectors (mainly public enterprises), developing 
countries’ labour markets are already flexible in terms of employment practices. Instead, the 
real challenge is to create not just more, but better, jobs. At the global level, the World Bank’s 
flagship World Development Report 2013 was on jobs and its regional report on South Asia 
(World Bank, 2012b) was on more and better jobs in South Asia. These reports also suggest a 
greater convergence of views between the World Bank and the ILO on the role of well-
functioning labour market institutions (see, for example, Amjad, 2013b). 
It is, therefore, not very surprising that the most recent World Bank country economic 
memorandum submitted to the newly elected government that took over in June 2013 is on 
finding the path to job-enhancing growth (see World Bank, 2013). The central tenet of this report 
is that Pakistan has the potential to recover high growth and create formal and informal jobs. 
The real challenge lies not in creating low-productivity jobs but better jobs as well in sustaining 
growth acceleration in the medium term. This, the report argues, will not result from just 
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reviving high growth but also from ensuring that the growth is accompanied “by a shift from 
low-skilled to high-skilled jobs. From farming and self-employment to wage employment. 
And—to some extent—from informal to formal employment. This process is called job-
enhancing growth” (World Bank, 2013, p. 5). 
The report outlines a number of measures for reviving growth to at least 7 percent to absorb the 
expected growth in the labour force. These measures are both for the short term (overcoming 
energy shortages and regaining macroeconomic stability) as well as for the medium and long 
term (improving the law and order situation and undertaking economic reforms, including 
trade and banking reforms, to increase productivity, efficiency, and global competitiveness). 
While the report makes a number of important recommendations for fostering high growth that 
would generate jobs faster, it is less clear on the measures needed to create better jobs. It does 
not argue that a lack of labour market flexibility prevents the creation of more and better jobs, 
but, at the same time, it also does not seriously examine the positive role that labour market 
institutions can play in creating better jobs—especially by guaranteeing rights and a voice at 
work through their elected representatives. In this sense, the World Bank still has some hurdles 
to overcome in making its case for the creation of better jobs. 
In this study, we also critically examine part of the World Bank’s (2013) analysis, especially as it 
relates to the paper’s central theme of the manufacturing sector’s role as a major driver of 
employment growth in Pakistan. 
 
Part III 
The Major Sources of Economic and Employment Growth in Pakistan 
It is important to analyse the changing role of different sectors in driving economic growth as 
well as their past contribution to job generation to be able to gauge the role they can play in the 
future development of the economy and their potential for creating productive and decent 
employment opportunities. 
Recent studies on sources and patterns of economic growth and employment in Pakistan  
Not only has economic growth taken place in spurts in Pakistan, but the overall trend growth 
rate has also declined since the 1990s. Both these cyclical fluctuations and the contribution of 
different sectors to the slowing down of economic growth have been the subject of close 
enquiry. We review the latter as this is more relevant to our analysis. 
A recent study by the World Bank (Lopez-Calix, Srinivasan, & Waheed, 2013) explores 
Pakistan’s growth patterns during the period 1980–2010 through a growth accounting 
framework applied to four factors of production—capital, labour, human capital (measured by 
years of schooling), and land (measured by arable land). This is applied to the overall economy 
as well as the three major sectors—agriculture, industry, and services. The study separates the 
individual contributions of labour productivity (output per worker) and labour accumulation 
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(employment) to real output growth and then estimates the contribution of capital, human 
capital, land, and TFP to labour productivity. TFP is measured by the residual term and taken to 
represent the contribution of changes in technology and the efficiency with which inputs are 
used. The results of this exercise are shown in Table 6 below. 
Table 6: Sources of annual growth in labour productivity, FY1981–FY2011 
Average annual percentage rate of change 
 Period 
Real 
output 
growth 
Investment 
as % of GDP 
(constant 
prices 2000) 
Employment 
growth 
Output 
per 
worker 
growth 
Output per worker: 
Percent contribution of 
Physical 
capital 
Human 
capital 
Arable 
land TFP 
Total 
economy 
FY81-FY90 6.1 18.18 1.8 4.3 1.2 0.9 -0.2 2.4 
FY91-FY00 4.4 18.79 2.4 1.9 0.8 -0.2 -0.3 1.5 
FY01-FY10 4.8 16.56 3.8 0.9 0.1 0.6 -0.4 0.6 
FY81-FY11 5.0 17.69 2.7 2.2 0.7 0.4 -0.3 1.4 
Agriculture FY81-FY90 4.0 1.95 1.8 2.2 1.4 0.4 -0.7 1.2 
FY91-FY00 4.4 2.11 1.6 2.8 1.0 -0.1 -0.6 2.4 
FY01-FY10 2.7 1.64 3.2 -0.5 0.0 0.1 -1.8 1.2 
FY81-FY11 3.6 1.88 2.3 1.3 0.8 0.1 -1.1 1.5 
Industry FY81-FY90 7.7 5.77 2.0 5.6 1.7 0.7 0.0 2.1 
FY91-FY00 4.2 6.87 1.0 3.2 2.7 -0.1 0.0 0.6 
FY01-FY10 6.1 5.26 5.0 1.0 -0.9 0.5 0.0 1.5 
FY81-FY11 5.8 5.87 2.7 3.0 1.0 0.3 0.0 1.6 
Services FY81-FY90 6.6 10.47 2.8 3.7 0.6 1.2 0.0 1.8 
FY91-FY00 4.5 9.81 3.7 0.8 0.2 -0.3 0.0 0.8 
FY01-FY10 5.1 9.66 4.1 1.0 0.2 0.7 0.0 0.1 
FY81-FY11 5.4 9.94 3.5 1.8 0.3 0.5 0.0 0.9 
Source: Lopez-Calix et al. (2013). 
The main empirical findings of this study and its major conclusions are as follows: 
 To a large extent, Pakistan’s growth is still driven by agriculture with a high correlation 
between real GDP and real agricultural growth. With the economy slowing down, this 
role has, since the 2000s, shifted to services. 
 The last 30 years’ growth in Pakistan has been driven mainly by labour and capital 
accumulation rather than by productivity gains as measured by TFP; this has declined in 
the 2000s to a quarter of its level in the 1980s. 
 The contribution of TFP to economic growth has declined in all sectors since the 1980s, 
including in industry where it was particularly strong in the earlier period. 
 The main reason for the decline in TFP is that structural reforms have been growth-
reducing rather than growth-enhancing. Since the 1990s and 2000s also witnessed 
considerable efforts at economic reforms, these did not have the desired results because 
“structural reforms were fragmented, badly sequenced or truncated . 
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Job generation and growth decomposition: Understanding the sectoral pattern of growth and 
its employment and productivity intensity in Pakistan 
We have carried out a broadly similar exercise using a World Bank-developed model to 
generate results, but one that has the advantage of bringing out somewhat more sharply the 
sectoral contributions to employment and productivity growth in the economy. However, we 
concentrate on the last period, i.e., 2000–10, so as to highlight what has happened more recently 
and to bring out the differences in the two sets of results and their policy implications. 
Using the World Bank’s Job Generation and Growth Decomposition (JoGGs) tool, we draw 
attention to Pakistan’s growth decomposition over the period of analysis and its two 
subperiods: period 1 (2000/01 to 2006/07) and period 2 (2005/06 to 2010/11). Period 3 defines 
the overall ten-year period from 2000/01 to 2010/11. The Shapely decomposition methodology 
is used to gauge the importance of each component of the decomposition exercise.  
Pakistan registered a growth rate of 27.6 percent in per capita GDP (value-added) during the 
overall period 2000/01 to 2010/11. Table 7 gives the results of the decomposition of aggregate 
per capita growth into its main components. 
Table 7: Decomposition of growth in per capita value-added, 2000/01 to 2010/11 
Growth component 
1999 (PRs) 
Percent of total change in per 
capita value-added growth 
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 
Total growth in per capita GDP (value-added) 6,522.8 2,359.7 7,181.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Growth linked to output per worker 3,614.6 65.3 3,255.0 55.4 2.8 45.3 
Growth linked to changes in employment rate 2,487.5 2,254.8 2,638.9 38.1 95.6 36.8 
Growth linked to changes in the share of the 
working-age population 
420.7 39.6 1,287.1 6.5 1.7 17.9 
Source: World Bank JoGGs tool with data from Pakistan Economic Survey for 2006/07 and 2011/12 and World Bank 
growth calculations for Pakistan. 
Of the actual growth in GDP per capita between FY2001 and FY2007 (25.1 percent), 55.4 percent 
is linked to growth in output per worker. In other words, more than half the growth in per 
capita GDP value-added (13.9 percent of the actual growth of 25.1 percent) is linked to this 
component. The employment rate contributes to 38.1 percent of the actual growth in per capita 
GDP value-added (9.5 percent). Moreover, the growth linked to changes in the share of the 
working-age population is calculated to be 6.5 percent—1.6 percent of the actual growth of 25.1 
percent. 
In the period of economic slowdown (FY2006–FY2011), growth linked to productivity (output 
per worker) experienced a sharp decline to 2.8 percent. The change in the employment rate had 
a much larger impact: 95.6 percent. The demographic component (as reflected in the change in 
the share of the working-age population) also registered a weak link with growth. For the 
overall period FY2001–FY2011, the growth components linked to output per worker, changes in 
the employment rate, and the population of working age were fairly moderate but still 
significant.  
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Table 8 presents data on employment by sector. During FY2001–FY2007, the aggregate increase 
in total employment was 27.5 percent. The high employment growth in the industrial sector 
contributed 47.5 percent to the increase in total employment. Overall, the employment rate 
increased by 8.9 percent as a consequence of the simultaneous growth in the working-age 
population. Industry contributed 26.1 percent—the highest share in the total percentage 
increase. 
Table 8: Employment by sectors of economic activity, 2000/01 to 2010/11 
 
 
 
Total employment Employment/working-age population 
Percent change Percent change 
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 
Agriculture 14.5 24.4 33.3 -2.2 11.8 1.7 
Industry 47.5 22.5 67.4 26.1 10.1 27.8 
Services 35.4 11.7 44.9 15.7 0.4 10.6 
Total 27.5 19.4 43.3 8.9 7.3 9.4 
Source: World Bank JoGGs tool with data from Pakistan Economic Survey for 2006/07 and 2011/12 and World Bank 
growth calculations for Pakistan. 
During FY2006–FY2011, total employment by sectors of economic activity declined from 27.5 
percent to 19.4 percent. Employment as a percentage of the population of working age 
remained relatively stable, with the share of industry falling by more than half compared to the 
previous period. Overall, during the ten years, we see that industry absorbed most of the labour 
force.  
Table 9 shows the decomposition of output per worker, capital stock, the capital-labour ratio, 
and the change in the share of capital in total income. Here, we have used data compiled by 
Lopez-Calix et al. (2013), who have constructed a capital series for Pakistan giving us capital 
stock figures for the periods under consideration. We report the results for a constant share of 
capital in total income of 30 percent. The table shows the role of capital and TFP as well as inter-
sectoral shifts. Between FY2001 and FY2007, total output per worker increased by 13.2 percent. 
Of this increase, inter-sectoral employment shifts had a positive effect on total output per 
worker, contributing PRs4,451 to total productivity growth in absolute terms. The capital-labour 
ratio fell slightly by 0.2 percent. Period 2 was marked by extremely low productivity growth: 
capital stock experienced a relative decline while the capital-labour ratio increased. Overall, the 
decade saw a rise in capital stock, the capital-labour ratio, and TFP net of inter-sectoral shifts. 
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Table 9: Decomposition of output per worker, capital stock, capital-labour ratio, and share of 
capital in total income, 2000/01 to 2010/11 
 
 
Percent change 
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 
Share of capital in total income (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Capital 27.2 22.9 47.7 
Total output per worker 13.2 0.2 11.7 
Output per worker net of inter-sectoral shifts 8.6 2.2 8.8 
Capital-labour ratio -0.2 2.9 3.1 
TFP residual net of inter-sectoral shifts 8.7 1.3 7.8 
Source: World Bank JoGGs tool with data from Pakistan Economic Survey for 2006/07 and 2011/12 and World Bank 
growth and capital stock calculations for Pakistan (2012). 
Table 10 gives the results for growth decomposition in terms of the percent contribution to total 
growth in GDP value-added per capita during FY2001–FY2011. In period 1, between FY2001 
and FY2007, the total percentage change in value-added per capita of 25.1 is attributed to the 
following sectoral contribution aggregates: the contribution of within-sector changes in output 
per worker (36 percent), the contribution of changes in employment (38.1 percent), and the 
contribution of inter-sectoral shifts (19.4 percent). Overall, services contributed the most 
towards total growth in per capita value-added, followed closely by industry during the period. 
The population of working age added 6.5 percent to total growth per capita within the period, 
owing to the youth bulge that Pakistan currently faces. 
Table 10: Contribution to total growth in GDP (value-added) per capita, 2000/01 to 2010/11 
 
Percent contribution of 
Total 
Within-sector 
changes in output 
per worker 
Changes in 
employment Inter-sectoral shifts 
Perio
d 1 
Perio
d 2 
Perio
d 3 
Perio
d 1 
Perio
d 2 
Perio
d 3 
Perio
d 1 
Perio
d 2 
Perio
d 3 
Perio
d 1 
Perio
d 2 
Perio
d 3 
Sectoral contributions 
Agriculture 5.9 -29.2 2.1 -4.5 66.7 3.2 11.1 -12.4 7.1 12.5 25.1 12.4 
Industry 6.5 -13.5 2.2 20.1 27.1 19.6 3.5 1.7 3.3 30.1 15.2 25.1 
Services 23.6 72.0 29.8 22.5 1.8 14.0 4.8 -15.8 0.9 50.9 58.0 44.6 
Subtotal 36.0 29.3 34.1 38.1 95.6 36.8 19.4 -26.5 11.2 93.6 98.3 82.8 
Demographic 
component 
         6.5 1.7 17.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Total percent change in value-added per capita 25.1 7.7 27.6 
Source: World Bank JoGGs tool with data from Pakistan Economic Survey for 2006/07 and 2011/12 and World Bank 
growth calculations for Pakistan. 
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Period 2, depicting low growth in Pakistan, contributed the least to total growth in GDP value-
added per capita. Overall, during the ten years, industry was still one of the major driving 
forces in terms of its contribution to changes in employment—including inter-sectoral 
employment shifts—even though the sector’s productivity declined over time. The services 
sector did well on all three decomposed sectoral contribution indicators over the decade. 
Some other results of the exercise are consolidated in Appendix A. We have also carried out 
growth decompositions using the same tool for the three periods in our analysis above, this 
time presenting data on the industry sector subdivided into manufacturing and 
nonmanufacturing. The results are broadly similar for the industry sector either way.  
Our analysis suggests that the labour absorption capacity of industry and services increased 
during the ten-year period: the greatest employment was generated by the industry and 
services sectors, even after taking into account the simultaneous increase in the population of 
working age. Inter-sectoral shifts in employment also contributed to the overall growth of the 
economy but not to a large extent. TFP figures for the different periods were crucial in 
determining the behaviour of individual sectors. The services sector played a more important 
role than industry and agriculture in the overall growth of GDP value-added. Even though 
agriculture recorded growth in output, services took the lead during the decade.  
Some important conclusions from the two studies 
We have analysed in considerable detail the contribution of industry, services, and agriculture 
to productivity, employment, and TFP over the period FY2001–FY2010 to show not only the 
contributing role of the industry sector but also to bring out also some fundamental differences 
in our analysis compared to Lopez-Calix et al. (2013). The two analyses differ in terms of results 
and main policy conclusions. Moreover, substituting manufacturing for industry does not make 
any real difference to the findings. These are spelled out as follows: 
(i) It is misleading to treat the overall period FY2001–FY2011 as a whole and draw 
from it analytical findings on key variables and policy conclusions. 
(ii) The main message that emerges from our analysis by breaking down this period 
into a high-growth phase and a low-growth phase is that it is primarily economic 
growth that drives productivity, employment, and TFP growth. This is as true for 
the 2000s as it is for the 1980s and 1990s. 
(iii) An important conclusion that emerges from our analysis is that, while 
undertaking economic reforms is important and they can facilitate growth, they 
are not in themselves the major driver of economic growth. The major driver is 
investment, primarily in response to the growth of demand and profitability. 
During a period of high investment and the resulting high growth, both labour 
productivity and TFP rise because investment embodies the latest knowledge 
and new technology as postulated by Kaldor (1966) and more recently by 
Ocampo (2005). Pakistan’s problem stems from very low investment in both 
physical and human capital. 
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(iv) The policy focus, therefore, must shift from an emphasis solely on economic 
reforms, which are primarily structural and have a medium- to long-term impact 
on reviving investment and growth. Pakistan’s current downturn reflects 
primarily a lack of business confidence due to the security situation arising from 
the conflict on its western borders. 
(v) Besides the security situation, reforms are needed immediately in two key areas. 
The first relates to overcoming the country’s severe energy shortages, which are a 
major hindrance to new investment and higher capacity utilisation of the current 
capital stock. The second relates to macroeconomic measures to restore 
macroeconomic stability, primarily by raising the tax-to-GDP ratio, which 
remains abysmally low at less than 9 percent.  
The profitability of manufacturing firms quoted on the Karachi Stock Exchange 
To further build up the argument that the economy was not demand-constrained in the 2000s, 
we examine the movement in profitability as represented by the rate of return on net assets and 
price-cost margins for nonfinancial, mainly manufacturing, companies quoted on the Karachi 
Stock Exchange over this period. 
As Figure 3 shows, both profitability and price-cost margins increased during the period of high 
growth FY2001–FY2007. The global slowdown and compression of domestic demand to restore 
macroeconomic stability under an IMF programme led to a sharp decline in the next two years. 
Subsequently, profitability picked up again and rose gradually over the next two years. 
Figure 3 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on consolidated balance sheet data from the State Bank of Pakistan for 
nonfinancial companies. 
The behaviour of profitability in the foods sector (Figure 4) also brings out rising consumption 
demand during FY2006–FY2011. The sector’s consistent and much higher profitability testifies 
that consumption demand kept increasing throughout this period. 
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Figure 4 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on consolidated balance sheet data from the State Bank of Pakistan for 
nonfinancial companies. 
 
Part IV 
Can Manufacturing Serve as an Engine of Economic Growth and Create More and 
Better Jobs? 
Keeping in mind the main results that emerged from the growth accounting exercises in Part III, 
we now carry out a more in-depth analysis of the manufacturing sector to determine the extent 
to which the main findings are substantiated and the important qualifications and modifications 
that need to be made when interpreting these results. We start by breaking down the 
manufacturing sector into its two major components: the large-scale sector and the small-scale 
and household sector.  
Large-scale manufacturing 
The high capital intensity of large-scale manufacturing, as reflected in the sector’s high capital-
output ratio and lack of employment generation, has been an area of considerable concern since 
the 1960s. An important study by Khan (1970) found that, not only was capital intensity 
extremely high compared to that of small-scale manufacturing and other sectors, but also that 
the capital intensity of a number of Pakistani industries was higher than that of Japan. A major 
reason for this high capital intensity was the prevalence of price distortions in the economy, 
including an overvalued exchange rate (which, since most industrial machinery had to be 
imported, grossly underestimated the scarcity price of capital), subsidised financial costs, 
accelerated depreciation, and tax holidays (see Guisinger, 1981). 
It was hoped that the devaluation of the Pakistani rupee in 1972 to a more realistic exchange 
rate would help reduce this distortion and thus lead to a more optimal choice of technology in 
the import of industrial machinery and, in turn, generate more jobs. This immediate expected 
impact was considered to have been compromised considerably by the significant decline in 
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private investment in large-scale manufacturing due to the government’s earlier nationalisation 
policies. Most public investment in this sector was in heavy industries, namely steel and heavy 
engineering, and in the manufacture of machinery and machine tools, which, again generated 
fewer jobs. 
The ILO-ARTEP (1983) study, which reviews data for the 1960s and 1970s, concludes the 
following: 
 In Pakistan, the process of structural transformation from a predominantly agrarian 
economy to one with a significant manufacturing sector began soon after independence. 
Despite the slowdown in the 1970s, the share of manufacturing output in GDP increased 
from 8 percent of GDP in 1949/50 to 17 percent in 1981/82 (see Table Annexe 1). 
 Within manufacturing, the share of large-scale manufacturing in GDP increased from 2.2 
percent in 1949/50 to 12.5 percent in 1969/70. Due to the slowdown in the 1970s, it was 
still at this level in 1981/82 (see Table Annexe 2). 
 The process of structural change in the economy in the 1960s and 1970s was not 
proportionally reflected in the share of employment in the manufacturing sector in total 
employment. Its share reached 13.4 percent of the labour force in 1960  and was at the 
same level of 13.4 percent in 1982/83.  
 The share of large-scale manufacturing employment in the total labour force was 2.5 
percent in 1960/61 and increased only marginally to 2.7 percent in 1982/83. 
 Of the total employment in manufacturing, the relative share of large-scale 
manufacturing was 18.3 percent in 1960/61, which increased only marginally to 21 
percent in 1971/72 and remained at this level till 1977/78. In contrast, the share of large-
scale manufacturing in total manufacturing was 30 percent in 1949/50; it increased to 
almost 80 percent in 1969/70 but declined to 73 percent in 1981/82.  
 The study also revealed the fragility of using employment elasticity as an indicator of 
the labour absorption capacity of the large-scale manufacturing sector, which increased 
almost threefold in the 1970s compared to the 1960s from around 0.27 to 0.75. This 
reflected more the drastic slowdown in growth (from over 10 percent to around 5 
percent) than a capacity to generate greater employment (which increased only 
marginally from 3.1 to 3.3 percent). 
There was little change in the low employment-generating capacity of the large-scale 
manufacturing sector in the next two decades, as a detailed ILO (2000) study on employment, 
output, and productivity shows. In response to the question why the sector’s employment 
absorptive capacity had continued to decline in the 1980s and 1990s, the study argued that, in 
the 1980s, large-scale manufacturing had followed an “internationally established pattern of 
capital-augmenting, labour-substituting growth, increasing profit shares and reducing the wage 
share” (p. 6). For the 1990s, it added deflationary policies as a result of the structural adjustment 
programmes entered into by the government, which dampened recovery in manufacturing and 
further constrained capacity utilisation and employment. 
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For the decade 2000–10, any analysis of the large-scale manufacturing sector is constrained by 
the fact that the last CMI for which data are available was carried out in 2005/06. However, 
there was no major change even in the first half of this decade in terms of the sector’s 
employment-generating capacity. 
To try to adjust for non-responding firms as well as the fact that the CMI’s overall frame does 
not cover all large-scale manufacturing firms, we have tried to give a rough estimate of the 
possible employment in the large-scale manufacturing sector. This works out at around 1.5 
million employed in large-scale manufacturing (Table 11) and increases its share to about 25 
percent of total employment in the manufacturing sector. However, only the results of the 
2011/12 census will give us a better idea of the actual numbers.  
Table 11: Employment in the manufacturing sector 
 1960/61 1971/72 1977/78 1982/83 2001/02 2005/06 2011/12 
Large-scale 
manufacturing 
337,000 480,000 580,000 690,000 690,122 941,283 1,500,000 c 
Small-scale a 
manufacturing 
1,501,000 1,806,150 2,398,928 2,699,044 4,264,878 5,738,717 4,632,090 
Total 
manufacturing 
1,838,000 2,2286,150 2,978,928 3,389,044 4,955,000 5,780,000 6,132,090 
Total labour force b 13,517,000 18,270,000 21,840,000 25,220,000 40,865,000 50,640,000 59,740,000 
Note: a = residual of total and large-scale manufacturing sector, b = derived from Labour Force Survey, c = estimate 
(corrected for underestimation). 
Source: ILO/ARTEP (1983) and Labour Force Survey (various issues). 
Small-Scale and Household Manufacturing 
It is best not to get into any precise definition of the small-scale manufacturing sector as these 
vary widely. In the national accounts, the small-scale sector is the residual of what is not 
covered by formal, organised large-scale manufacturing, i.e., it consists of firms that employ 
fewer than ten workers. The detailed census periodically conducted by the statistical authorities 
covers firms employing more than ten workers, but these represent only a small portion of the 
total sample. The small-scale sector also includes households—mostly rural—that engage in 
manufacturing activities and comprise mainly self-employed artisans, although they may 
employ more than one person. These are around 20 percent of the total firms covered. 
It is also important to note that the official estimates of this sector’s growth are calculated using 
an indirect method. In the 1950s and 1960s, these estimates were taken as equal to the growth 
rate of population. Subsequently, they were derived from the Census of Small-Scale 
Manufacturing Industries in terms of the recorded growth in the inter-censal period. When the 
census does not take place, the previous inter-censal estimates are used (which can be 
misleading) and then subsequently revised—this can create havoc with the national income 
accounts! Estimates of investment in small-scale manufacturing are derived indirectly and 
related to the growth of output, assuming a constant capital-output ratio. 
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Keeping these statistical anomalies in mind, we now try to decipher the growth and structural 
change that has taken place in the sector, which is believed in recent years to drive economic 
growth and account for the economy’s so-called resilience. 
It is now generally accepted that the growth of small-scale manufacturing was low in the 1950s 
and 1960s mainly because the incentive structure, i.e., the trade and exchange rate regime and 
credit, favoured large-scale manufacturing. The devaluation in 1972 that did away with the 
overvalued exchange rate, de-controls on imports, and the nationalisation of the banking sector 
all made the environment more conducive to the small-scale sector. What really spurred 
growth, however, was the increase in agricultural incomes and the inflow of large remittances, 
especially into small towns and rural areas (see Hamid, 1984). This boom continued in the 1980s 
as remittances rose further in the earlier years and the overall economy was driven by increases 
in foreign inflows (resulting from the Afghan war). This, in turn, led to overall high economic 
growth and growth in manufacturing. 
It is also important to keep in mind the strong links for many industries—e.g., light engineering 
(tubewells) and, later, automotive industries (cars, tractors, motorcycles)—that have developed 
between the large- and small-scale sectors. In addition, there are major sectors, e.g., sports 
goods and surgical instruments, which cater mainly for the export market and often operate in 
the small-scale sector. 
The best example of their vibrant growth is the so-called “Golden Triangle” in central Punjab, 
linking Sialkot, Gujranwala, and Gujrat as the hub of light engineering fans and some 
specialised exports. The triangle extends southwards and is estimated to cover around 75 
percent of the country’s engineering sector (with the rest located in and around Karachi). 
Unfortunately, earlier studies that analysed in detail the sector’s growth and structural change 
(e.g., ILO-ARTEP, 1983; Nadvi, 1990) have not been replicated for the recent period. Most of 
these focused on individual industries (e.g., fans, garments, automotive goods), but a number of 
their conclusions remain valid today. These include: 
(i) The very low cost of job creation and economically efficient use of capital and 
labour resources. 
(ii) Large divergence in economic efficiency, productivity, and technology use by 
firms in this sector, which represent a continuum from the lowest to the highest 
in terms of productivity. Hence, average estimates may be misleading. 
(iii) The low level of skills and skill shortages, which all studies identify as major 
constraints to growth. 
(iv) Lack of credit availability and poor marketing responsible for the slow growth of 
most firms. 
(v) Rampant consumption and high-handedness of officials, especially tax 
authorities and labour inspectors. 
(vi) In recent years, the lack of energy is identified as a binding constraint to output 
and new investment. 
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The question that needs to be addressed is why many of the firms in this sector continue to 
remain informal and unregistered. Some surveys have come up with the following reasons: 
(i) Firms avoid labour laws, including the minimum wage. 
(ii) Firms avoid harassment by government/local body officials. 
(iii) Firms avoid paying taxes and, in some cases, electricity, gas, and other charges. 
It is difficult to give weight to these reasons but what is clear is that a large part of the small-
scale sector remains unregistered and undocumented. 
Manufacturing: Strengths and weaknesses 
Figures 5 and 6 show growth and investment in manufacturing overall as well as separately for 
the large-scale and small-scale sectors. Since growth and investment in small-scale 
manufacturing is worked out indirectly based on inter-censal estimates and constant capital-
output ratios, the figures do not reflect year-to-year fluctuations or overall trends accurately. 
Even though the size of the sector may have been considerably underestimated, large-scale 
manufacturing clearly shows growth in output and investment in the boom years FY2000–
FY2007, with a collapse in the subsequent period. Trends in private investment in large-scale 
manufacturing follow the same movements as the total and account for most of the investment 
in this sector. 
These movements reinforce our earlier argument that the manufacturing sector did not run out 
of steam, even during 2000–10, as the earlier World Bank study seemed to suggest. It is also 
important to keep in mind that the slowdown in manufacturing was not across industries. 
Those that were mainly export-oriented, especially textiles, were badly hit by the financial crisis 
and global recession that followed post-2008, but other subsectors, especially food products and 
consumer durables (e.g., motor cycles), showed high growth and high profitability (Figures 4 
and 5). 
Figure 5 
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Figure 6 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Pakistan Economic Survey (various issues). 
The real weakness of the manufacturing sector lies in its failure to move to higher value-added 
products (Table 12) and diversify exports into more technologically advanced sectors (Table 13). 
This has meant that it has not been able to take advantage of the growing sectors in world trade 
and, hence, not benefited as it certainly could have during the period of rapid growth in global 
trade.  
Table 12: Average product shares in manufacturing, 1970–99 (percent) 
Product 1970–79 1980–89 1990–99 
Food and beverages 30.45 30.94 22.89 
Textiles 27.78 18.14 25.06 
Industrial chemicals 11.20 14.29 15.50 
Metals and nonmetals 9.10 14.20 13.20 
Petroleum and coal 5.27 6.01 3.26 
Electrical machinery 3.31 3.26 5.43 
Transport equipment 2.99 2.89 3.05 
Apparel, leather, and textiles 2.04 2.37 2.80 
Nonelectrical machinery 1.84 2.14 2.09 
Rubber and plastic 1.80 1.80 1.42 
Source: World Bank (2013). 
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Table 13: Technological level of exports, Pakistan and the world, 1998–2008 (percent) 
Sector 
Growth 
1998–2008 
Share 
1998–2000 
Share 
2006–08 
Growth 
1998–2008 
Share 
2008 
Primary 0.1 12.3 12.7 11.2 11.4 
Resource-based 23.9 3.5 10.9 10.5 14.8 
Low-technology 8.2 74.7 66.7 9.2 16.2 
Medium-technology 8.7 8.6 8.1 10.1 35.5 
High-technology 17.5 0.8 1.4 9.3 22.1 
Total 9.6   10.1  
 
Source: World Bank (2013). 
 
Part V 
Case Studies of the Automotive and Garments Sectors as Drivers of More and Better 
Jobs 
Picking winners in terms of targeting sectors or subsectors in the economy as future drivers of 
growth and employment generation has always been a hazardous task. More failures than 
successes tend to emerge, based on the experience of the Southeast and East Asian economies, 
although the line defining successes and failures remains somewhat uncertain and 
controversial. The rise and fall from economic grace of devising industrial policies to stimulate 
sustainable and high growth in industry with a concentration on specific sectors is also very 
much part of the economic history of planning in Pakistan—shelves full of studies gathering 
dust line the corridors of the Ministry of Industries and the Planning Commission. 
Yet the fact remains that, even after 65 years, the country’s industrial structure and 
manufacturing exports remain concentrated in a few industries. There has been little success in 
bringing out any major structural shift to higher value-added sectors within manufacturing or 
in the composition of Pakistan’s manufacturing exports to more knowledge-based and 
technologically advanced products. 
There is no dearth of explanations for why this structural shift remains elusive. The two major 
causes that have dominated as standard explanations include (i) the lack of economic reforms, 
which has allowed an inefficient industrial structure to persist free from global and domestic 
competition; and (ii) the lack of an educated and skilled workforce, which has acted as a major 
constraint to investment in more knowledge-technological skill-intensive industries in the 
manufacturing sector. 
The problem with these explanations is that, over the years, a number of economic reforms have 
indeed been undertaken and investment in human capital has increased. Though far from 
adequate, especially as regards tariff reforms and investment in human capital, it is still difficult 
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to explain why the structure of the manufacturing sector has stubbornly failed to respond to 
policy reforms and the somewhat better availability of an educated and skilled labour force.  
Our study of the automotive and garments subsectors8 is meant to illustrate what has gone 
wrong so far in the development of the former, how some of these policy failures can be 
rectified, and how some of these past mistakes can be avoided to galvanise growth in the 
garments sector. This is important given that the garments sector is now a major policy thrust 
area under the current Sharif government, specifically in its decision to open up a ”Garments 
City” outside Lahore to attract both foreign and domestic investment. 
In proposing support for the growth of these two industries, it should be made clear that the 
idea is not to encourage through protection or other support measures the growth of an 
inefficient and uncompetitive manufacturing sector, but one which, within a realistic but time-
bound framework, can become internationally competitive and foster the generation of 
productive, remunerative, and decent employment. 
Automotive Sector 
The auto-vending industry, which provides auto-parts and contributes around 42 percent of 
value-added to the automotive sector, has attained a medium level of technological 
sophistication and developed strong capabilities in casting, forging machinery, plastic injection 
moulding, rubber die casting, and rubber extrusion. It has managed to localise a large number 
of automotive parts and has significant export potential and opportunity to become part of the 
global supply chain. Already, 24 auto-parts manufacturers are exporters, their total exports 
valued at USD20 million in 2010/11. 
Sales, value-added, and employment 
The automotive sector covers the assembly of cars, motorcycles/rickshaws, tractors, 
trucks/buses, and parts manufactures, most of who are vendors in the unorganised sector 
(mostly ISIC 34 and 35 but also tractors under ISIC 29). Table 14 gives different estimates of the 
value of production, value-added, and employment in the sector for different years. The CMI 
2005/06 underestimates value-added and especially employment, but the sector has clearly 
witnessed very rapid growth over the last ten years or so (see Appendix B for more data on this 
sector, including details of the increase in production of cars, motorcycles, etc., over this 
period).  
Table 14: Sales, value-added, and employment in the automotive sector, 2005/06 
 CMI 2005/06 Pasha et al. (2011) SMEDA (2005) 
Sales (value of production) PRs212 billion PRs401 billion n/a 
Value-added PRs61 billion PRs108 billion PRs153 billion 
                                                    
8 These studies draw extensively on the studies conducted by Pasha (2011) for the automotive sector and Nabi and 
Hamid (2013) and Hussain et. al. (2013) for the garment sector. 
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Employment 28,269 209,234 500,000 
Source: CMI (2005/06), Pasha et al. (2011), and SMEDA (2005). 
Encouraging the growth of the automotive sector  
The growth of the automotive sector in Pakistan has taken place primarily under high tariff 
rates and an earlier deletion programme that resulted in the proliferation of a large number of 
vendors. Its growth has been driven by a high growth rate of demand over the last decade with 
a newly emerging middle class that is the main buyer of motorcycles, the production of which 
has now reached 1.7 million annually in 2013 compared to only around 815,000 in 2005/06. The 
level of locally produced inputs ranges from a low of 5 percent in the case of some makes of cars 
to almost 100 percent in the production of tractors, motorcycles, and three-wheelers. 
The essential challenge facing this industry is to make it competitive through the phased 
rationalisation of and reduction in its tariff structure, increasing domestic competition, and 
improving the quality and standards of production. Domestic demand has fluctuated with 
economic growth cycles as in 2002–07; it slowed down with the economy’s very low growth in 
the subsequent period. The jumpstarting of the economy in 2002/03—with low rates of interest 
and the availability of leasing facilities at low cost—was a major factor in stimulating demand 
over the next few years, which led to high growth rates of sales in cars and motorcycles. 
(i) Tariff rationalisation 
In July 2006, the deletion programme for the automotive industry was replaced by a tariff-based 
scheme to ensure compliance with trade-related investment measures (TRIMs). However, the 
increasing subsequent use of standard regulatory orders (SROs) has replaced tariffs in the guise 
of encouraging indigenisation by giving concessions to individual producers in response to 
industry pressure and vested interests.  
The current regulatory framework gives the Engineering Development Board (EDB) 
considerable discretionary powers in restricting imports of competing goods and raw materials, 
and thereby creates a nontariff barrier to imports. This amounts to a de facto continuation of the 
old “Import License Raj” and has led to allegations of considerable corruption in the EDB and 
the Ministry of Industries, which oversees it. 
As a result of this regulatory regime, effective protection is higher and governed by nontariff 
barriers in addition to high rates of duty. Pasha et al. (2011) have proposed a number of 
measures to rationalise the tariff regime, such as halving the current tariffs on vehicles to 35 
percent over a period of five years from the current effective rate of protection, which ranges 
from 98 percent for small cars (800 cc) to as high as 375 percent for large cars (above 1,500 cc). 
They also propose that the dispersion of tariffs should not exceed 15 percent and the same 
tariffs should apply to cars of different sizes (with excise duty applied to discourage 
conspicuous consumption). Moreover, they recommend that the EDB’s discretionary powers 
should be considerably reduced by removing the distinction between localised and non-
localised parts. 
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(ii) Increased domestic competition 
While there is virtually cutthroat competition in the market for motorcycles, there is still a high 
degree of concentration in car manufacturing and the market shares of individual producers 
have not changed considerably. Despite measures to ease the entry of new investors, a number 
of conditions have also been set that restrict entry. The import of used and reconditioned 
vehicles has been allowed in some cases, but the policy regime changes from year to year with 
significant pressure from local manufacturers. The Competition Commission of Pakistan needs 
to investigate this issue to increase competition and encourage entrants. 
(iii) Increasing exports and the impact of trade with India 
Pakistan’s share in world exports in automobile products is almost negligible. The industry still 
has a long way to go to become globally competitive though motorcycle producers are 
beginning to increase their sales to Afghanistan and Bangladesh. Most car manufacturers feel 
that giving most-favoured nation (MFN) status to India could damage domestic production, 
though again, producers of motorcycles and spare parts are fairly confident of being able to 
compete against Indian imports and of their ability to penetrate the Indian market. In case MFN 
status is given to India, the process of tariff reduction and rationalisation in the case of car 
manufacturers may need to be extended slightly. 
Creating more and better jobs in the automotive industry 
With the sector already employing 200,000 to 500,000 workers (as given by different estimates), 
the high elasticity of income demand, and the capacity for exports in selected products and 
parts, there is considerable potential for this sector to generate significant employment in the 
future, especially as the middle class expands as economic growth picks up. 
The share of the organised sector in total employment is very small—at best, between 10 and 15 
percent, even if we take into account the gross underestimation in the CMI figures. The 
overwhelming number of vendors producing auto-parts is in the informal small-scale sector. 
There are, however, associations of manufacturers that are quite active—mainly members from 
the formal sector but also some producers from the informal economy. 
While challenging, it may be possible to start a dialogue between the three major associations 
representing the automotive sector, representatives of national trade unions, and the 
government to explore ways of gradually formalising the large informal part of the sector, 
investing in skills development for the sector as a whole, and improving conditions of work, 
especially in those subsectors where workers are subject to hazardous working conditions. This 
would encourage both productivity growth and competitiveness in this sector. 
Garments industry 
As the epitome of “sweatshops in the sun” and after having been vilified (including by the ILO) 
following major fire incidents in Bangladesh and Pakistan that killed hundreds of people, it 
may seem inappropriate to identify the garments industry as a potentially leading sector for the 
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creation of more and better jobs in Pakistan. Yet there are important grounds for supporting its 
development. 
First and foremost, the garments industry is in the process of major structural changes resulting 
both from increasing global competition as well as an increase in specialisation and the 
development of “niche” markets (e.g., “technical” and “green” garments) to cater to changing 
consumer tastes. Firms relying on cheap labour and low-technology unskilled workers will find 
it increasingly difficult to survive. To remain active in global value-chains, firms will need to 
invest in skills and technological upgrades, and take advantage of working in clusters, thus 
increasing their share of value-added products through design and brand development. 
Second, Pakistan, as the world’s eighth largest producer of raw cotton, has traditionally 
depended on textiles as its leading sector in bringing about early industrialisation. Even today, 
the dominance of this sector has led to Pakistan being characterised as a “cottonomics” 
economy. The manufacturing of textiles accounted for 53.2 percent of employment in large-scale 
manufacturing (about 500,000 workers) and 28.6 percent of value-added in 2005/06, of which 
apparel accounted for 6.6 percent of employment and 4.3 percent of value-added. However, 
garments are concentrated in the small-scale sector. Textiles contributed about half of Pakistan’s 
total exports (USD13.6 billion in 2011/12), of which garments accounted for around a quarter or 
USD3.72 billion. Yet the textiles sector remains at the lowest end of the value-chain, producing 
and exporting yarn and low value-added garments after almost 60 years. 
Third, China’s planned movement out of the garments sector opens up a huge export market of 
USD130 billion (and more as China becomes a net importer of garments) for which Pakistan 
could compete. The total global market for garments is valued at USD350 billion and is growing 
at around 5 percent per annum. Currently, Pakistan has a miniscule share of this market in 
which China is the leading exporter, followed by the European Union (EU), Hong Kong, 
Bangladesh, Turkey, and India. 
Fourth, Pakistan was granted GSP-plus status by the EU in January 2014, which could lead to an 
annual increase in garments exports of between USD580 million and USD700 million of a total 
estimated annual increase valued at USD2 billion. This boost could serve as an important 
impetus to the garments industry and help it regain some of the ground lost following the end 
of the MFN regime in 2005 as other countries, especially Bangladesh, benefit in the MFN round. 
Fifth, the present Sharif government is targeting the garments sector to attract foreign 
investment, increase exports, and generate employment, especially for women. A “garments 
city” is being set up near Lahore (in Sheikhupura) to produce specialised garments utilising 
manufacturing structures that respond to the requirements of fast-changing fashions and 
designer lines. The project is being run as a private-public partnership with the majority of the 
board of directors drawn from the private sector. The Punjab government aims to provide 
housing and technical training to workers onsite by setting up an industrial training institute 
and specialised training programmes through the Technical Education and Vocational Training 
Authority (TEVTA), which operates under the provincial government. 
Finally, in a sad but important way, the recent tragic fires in the garments industry and 
considerable loss of life has—as a result of international pressure and the possible boycott of 
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imports by major buyers—led to considerable pressure on garment producers to improve 
working conditions, including by working closely with the ILO. The expected grant of MFN-
plus status by the EU has also made producers aware of the ratification and regular monitory of 
27 international conventions, of which 16 relate to human rights and 11 to labour rights. 
Case studies of firms 
Two important studies undertaken recently (Nabi & Hamid, 2013; Hussain et al., 2013) on the 
garments industry in Pakistan include surveys of garment firms and interviews with 
proprietors and managers in an attempt to identify the major challenges that firms face in 
breaking into higher value-added products and competing in the global market. 
Some of the major findings of these studies are as follows: 
(i) While successful companies in the global market have moved up from captive 
and contractual arrangements to relational (with leading brand manufacturers) 
and modular arrangements (with local and international buying houses), 
Pakistani firms appear to be “trapped” in a low equilibrium—producing low-
price items for mass retail. 
(ii) With technological advancements and the introduction of micro-electronics at all 
stages of garment production—increasing the need to upgrade equipment and 
the demand for skilled labour—Pakistani firms have lagged behind, especially in 
CAD and CNC cutting and computer-aided manufacturing. 
(iii) Few Pakistani garment firms have become own-design manufacturers, and 
cluster formation through globalisation has been limited. 
(iv) Pakistani firms need to upgrade their technological capability, gain access to 
skilled labour and training institutes, anticipate changing demand patterns, and 
invest in machinery and IT hardware/software to sustain growth. 
(v) As far as the entire manufacturing sector and the garments industry is 
concerned, the growing duration of power outages has emerged as the major 
binding constraint, followed by corruption and lack of available skills. As 
regards skills, there is a dearth of female salaried operators in knitwear, who are 
generally hired in countries such as Bangladesh and China.  
The ILO is already working with the Pakistan Readymade Garments Manufacturers and 
Exporters Association to provide training through fire safety workshops. There is a need to 
build on this relationship and take advantage of the growing awareness among producers and 
the government of the need to respect basic workers’ rights of association and collective 
bargaining and to improve conditions of work. This applies all the more with the EU having 
granted GSP-plus status to Pakistani exports. 
It is encouraging that, even at the planning stage of the garments city near Lahore, considerable 
attention is being given to working conditions, and that the garments industry and employers 
are themselves pushing forward these initiatives. 
40 
 
 
Part VI 
Major Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
The major conclusions and policy recommendations that emerge from this study are put 
together under the following headings. 
Reigniting economic growth under an IMF programme 
More, and especially better, jobs can only be generated in a growing economy. Sustained 
economic growth has, however, remained elusive due to recurring foreign exchange crises 
resulting from unsustainable fiscal and balance-of-trade deficits. Pakistan has had to resort to 
IMF support to avoid default and has been under 11 different IMF programmes for more than 
12 years. The present Sharif government entered into an Extended Fund Facility programme 
soon after coming into power in September 2013. Before that, the PPP government had entered 
into a Standby Agreement with the IMF in October 2008, which it then abandoned in June 2011. 
Two key questions are, first, whether economic growth can be ignited under a strong 
stabilisation programme that the IMF conditionalities as well as current macroeconomic 
imbalances dictate; and second, if the economic reforms under this programme will succeed in 
leading to higher and sustainable growth. 
At least on the performance of the economy in the last 25 years, the answer to both questions 
appears on balance to be negative. Except for a short-lived spurt during FY2003–FY2007, 
economic growth has failed to pick up. Even this spurt can be traced largely to increases in 
foreign aid inflows post-9/11, manifold increases in remittances, and the global trade boom 
rather than to the reforms undertaken in the preceding three years as part of an IMF 
programme, as some economists have argued (Husain, 2003). In fact, the series of reforms 
undertaken in the last two decades as part of different agreements entered into with the IMF 
have not resulted in generating sustainable growth. Nor have they resulted in bringing about 
the needed structural changes, which, among others, would have made the economy less 
vulnerable to external shocks. Pakistan’s economy faltered in the face of the rising global price 
of oil and foodgrains in 2007 even before the financial crisis unfolded in 2008. India and other 
South Asian economies were able to better deflect the global financial crisis, even if the Indian 
economy has slowed down more recently (see Amjad & Din, 2010).  
The international financial institutions’ (IFIs) (see World Bank, 2013) view is that reforms were 
not fully implemented and, when undertaken, were wrongly sequenced. This criticism is partly 
justified: except for the one instance in the early years of the Musharraf government, Pakistan 
has never fully gone through the cycle and completed any of the other ten IMF programmes. 
However, many economic reforms were initiated as part of these programmes. 
Our view takes a somewhat different approach. We do not argue against economic reforms that 
will make the economy more efficient—by relying more on market-driven forces—and more 
globally competitive. Indeed, we support many of the suggested reforms. However, we argue 
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that economic reforms per se are not sufficient to ignite growth in the economy. The binding 
constraint to Pakistan’s growth is the collapse in investment and policymakers need to 
concentrate on reviving investment that could then be the basis for reigniting growth and 
leading to sustainable and higher economic growth.  
This would require: 
(i) Giving the highest priority to attaining peace on the country’s western borders 
and, through this, improving the security and law and order situation, which has 
been adversely affected in turn 
(ii) Restoring domestic and foreign investors’ confidence as a result of the above; 
fully opening up trade and investment flows with India by granting it MFN 
status while putting in place safeguards to allay fears that it will not use non-
tariff barriers against Pakistan’s major competitive exports 
(iii) Maintaining a high level of public sector investment, primarily the Public Sector 
Development Programme (PSDP), rather than reducing it drastically as 
stipulated in the IMF programme (given the high PSDP multiplier impact on the 
economy9) through cuts in nondevelopment expenditure, including subsidies on 
fuel and support for highly loss making state-owned enterprises 
(iv) Reducing interest rates from the current double-digit level (10 percent) rather 
than increasing them as recently done in November 2013 under the current IMF 
programme; it is worth keeping in mind that monetary policy has proved 
ineffective in containing inflation in the face of unsustainable and extremely high 
fiscal deficits being financed by State Bank borrowing (i.e., printing money) 
(v) Overcoming the energy gap by adjusting prices and reducing theft and other 
leakages 
(vi) Providing better economic management and reducing corruption, which has 
become rampant in recent years. 
Resurrecting the manufacturing sector 
The emphasis in this paper is on the manufacturing sector and we have clearly shown that it has 
the potential to serve as a major driver of economic growth and create more and better jobs. 
However, this will require concerted action in a number of areas as outlines below. 
Tapping the growing forces of demand for manufacturers 
The domestic market is growing, driven by rapid urbanisation, remittances, an emerging 
middle class—estimated in 2010 at around 25–30 percent of the population (Nayab, 2011)—and 
growing rural incomes. Pakistan’s GSP-plus status granted recently by the EU (effective from 
January 2014) and new export market opportunities, especially in garments as China moves into 
                                                    
9 The fiscal multiplier of a cut in the national PSDP equivalent to 1 percent of GDP leads to a 2 percent decline in GDP 
in the same year (Pakistan, Planning Commission, 2011).  
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higher-value added goods, will further boost demand in the manufacturing sector. There is also 
considerable potential in exploiting economies of agglomeration and connectivity through the 
spread and better use of information and communication technology, which has been relatively 
neglected in the past. 
Overcoming the skills constraint 
Investing in education and skills remain the two most neglected areas of Pakistan’s economic 
development. The only improvements are in higher education: enrolment has increased almost 
fivefold in the last ten years, especially female enrolment, which is now almost half of the total 
1.4 million enrolled. Additionally, the Punjab government has taken a number of recent 
initiatives for skills development, though their overall coverage of the total labour force is still 
limited. 
Our analysis of the market for skills and the factors leading to skill mismatch in the labour 
market leads us to conclude that the problem emanates not just from the supply side as is 
normally diagnosed. The demand for skills is considerably constrained by both the low returns 
on investment in skills and the current widespread labour hiring arrangements (covering 
almost 70 percent of organised manufacturing), which encourage the use of contract workers, 
especially in the organised large-scale manufacturing sector. Employers are reluctant to pay for 
higher skills or to invest in skills development, given that a large part of their labour force 
consists of contract workers hired through contractors. 
Tariff reforms 
Will increased foreign competition in the domestic market and the search for new higher value-
added products in the export market help increase investment in skills by employers and 
encourage them to move away from contract labour to hiring permanent employees? 
Theoretically, this should happen. Unfortunately, despite considerable tariff reforms, progress 
remains slow and disappointing. The structure of Pakistan’s manufacturing sector is still 
heavily biased towards lower value-added, mainly consumer goods and exports in low-
technology products.  
It is true that the far-reaching tariff reforms introduced post-1997 have, to some extent, been 
reversed post-2008 in the face of an unsustainable balance-of-payments situation. Under the 
current IMF programme, some of these measures are to be rolled back and the government has 
committed to reducing and rationalising the revised tariffs as well as removing SROs that act as 
a major restriction on imports and favour specific importers-cum-producers. 
The results are yet to be seen, but the fact remains that there is little agreement among 
policymakers on the adoption of a suitable tariff and exchange rate regime that would foster a 
“desirable” structure of industrial growth. A powerful lobby believes that such a desirable 
structure means giving preference to the growth of industries that produce high value-added 
engineering and related machinery through high tariff barriers and cloaked quantitative 
restrictions (under SROs). This is in sharp contrast to what we can broadly term “free trade” 
advocates (which includes the IFIs) who believe that “uniform and low tariffs” will result in an 
efficient and competitive industrial structure. 
43 
 
Given the strong vested interests that have built up, an easy solution to this conundrum may 
not be possible, at least not in the foreseeable future. In these circumstances, we recommend a 
second-best solution on the lines suggested by Pursell, Khan, and Gulzar (2011) in their study 
on tariff policy for the Planning Commission. 
These measures include: 
 Where SROs are becoming permanent, they should replace the statutory tariffs. 
 Tariffs in the 0 to 10 percent range should be unified; where customs duties concessions 
are given, they should be available to everyone, including traders and importers. 
 Tariffs in the 10 to 20 percent range should be reduced so that most raw materials are 
available in the 10 percent range. 
In addition, the following guidelines should be agreed on: 
 When targeting the growth of higher value-added sectors (e.g., engineering, including 
automotives) and affording them protection, this should be done through tariff 
adjustments and not SROs. This protection should be time-bound and the set target 
dates strictly enforced. 
 Government organisations or bodies set up to foster the growth of specific industries, 
e.g., the EDB, should be gradually wound up. The chambers and associations of 
producers in these sectors are now very well developed and can directly deal with the 
Ministries of Industries and Commerce. This will help reduce corruption and 
micromanagement, which results from the current arrangements. 
 Eventually, government policies should concentrate on the development of human 
capital rather than on targeting specific industries. This should take the form of giving 
much higher priority to education and skills development in terms of investment and 
supporting services. 
 It is extremely important to include workers’ representatives in skills development 
bodies at the federal and provincial level as well as at the local or district level. Most of 
the current bodies (e.g., NAVTEC at the federal level or TESDA in the Punjab) have no 
formal representation of workers. 
Raising productivity in small-scale manufacturing  
There are currently around 4.5 million workers in small-scale and household manufacturing, 
that is, around 75 percent of the labour force in manufacturing produces less than 20 percent of 
the sector’s value-added. For many of the enterprises operating in the small-scale and informal 
economy, this is reflected in the very low productivity per worker. In many cases, it is well 
below the minimum wage and indeed many of the workers employed live below the poverty 
line.  
In no other sector of the economy will investment in building an educated and skilled 
workforce have a higher return. The resulting growth in output and productivity—the latter 
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boosted through concerted efforts and incentives to upgrade skills—will create jobs and as 
productivity increases better jobs in this sector. This sector can then serve as a major driver of 
economic growth and manufactured exports by producing and exporting new products to new 
global markets. 
But how is this to be achieved? The major thrust must be on increasing primary and secondary 
enrolment and improving the quality of the education imparted. The second area is skills 
development as proposed earlier but with a specific focus on small-scale and unorganised 
enterprises. The focus of government support for this sector—including that of government-
supported organisations such as the Small and Medium Enterprises Development Authority 
(SMEDA) and other provincial bodies—needs to change. There is far too much emphasis on 
targeting particular industries, including for exports, where the focus is also mainly on large 
enterprises.  
There is clearly a justification for such interventions, and these have helped encourage growth 
and productivity in particular industries and specialised products. The focus needs to shift to 
creating a better and more conducive environment for this sector and removing obstacles to the 
growth of all enterprises, i.e., relatively large as well as small and microenterprises in this 
sector. 
Specifically, this means reducing the anti-small-scale bias in tariff policy (which results in the 
high cost of raw materials); providing infrastructure facilities, including space, for firms to 
operate; providing transportation and connectivity services; and, most important, providing 
access to finance, which, for most small firms, is a binding constraint to their expansion. From 
just a micro-interventionist vision, policies in favour of this sector should analyse the macro-
environment in which they operate and then suggest, support, and help implement specific 
policy changes and interventions that would support the growth of the small-scale sector.  
Creating more and better jobs 
The creation of more jobs in manufacturing needs a two-pronged strategy (“walking on two 
legs”): encouraging the growth of labour-intensive manufacturing as well as moving up the 
value-added ladder. We have spelled out a number of measures for achieving this, including 
specifically for two subsectors—garments and automotives.  
The aim, however, is not just to create any jobs but more productive, remunerative, and decent 
employment that results in an adequate income to cover basic needs, a degree of social 
protection, a voice at work through democratically elected representatives, and respect for 
workers’ fundamental rights. Even though this may not be immediately possible for the vast 
majority of the workforce, the real challenge lies in determining how to move in this direction. 
First and foremost is the revival of economic growth, including in the manufacturing sector, 
which, as our study shows, still has considerable potential for higher growth and job creation. 
With the labour force growing at 3–3.5 percent, the economy must grow at around 8 percent to 
productively absorb new entrants into the labour force, and even higher to increase the incomes 
and living conditions of the unemployed and of those living just above or below the poverty 
line. 
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Second, a concerted effort must be made to reduce the high growth rate of population. At 
around 2.1 percent, it remains among the highest in the region and could turn out to be even 
higher once the Population Census is held, which has not been done since 1998. 
Third, as distinct from other studies (e.g., World Bank, 2013), which hold that higher economic 
growth will result in jobs, we have argued that, while economic growth is a necessary 
condition, it is by no means a sufficient one. For productivity growth to translate into higher 
wages and incomes and improved living conditions, it is necessary to build strong and well 
functioning labour market institutions, and for elected governments to overtly protect workers’ 
rights and make good on their commitment to social justice by providing basic education, 
health, and adequate and affordable social protection to workers. In this context, some of the 
specific measures that this paper supports include:  
(i) Strengthening workers’ organisations that allow workers to effectively bargain 
with their employers through democratically elected representatives to ensure 
fair and liveable wages and better and safer working conditions 
(ii) Reintroducing labour inspection to ensure safe conditions of work while putting 
in place measures that prevent factory inspectors from unduly harassing 
employers 
(iii) Fixing minimum wages through a tripartite dialogue and agreement, and strictly 
enforcing minimum wages in the organised sector—this could gradually be 
extended to the small-scale and, eventually, the informal economy 
(iv) Extending social protection to all workers in large-scale manufacturing, finding 
ways to cover contract workers, and extending this gradually to firms in the 
small-scale sector  
(v) Inducing informal sector firms to register and enter the formal/documented 
economy. 
This paper also shows that, if Pakistan is to be an effective player in the global market for 
manufactured goods, it should carry the credentials that its goods are produced in an 
environment that respects human rights and protects basic workers’ rights. On a positive note, 
there are already signs that employers are becoming much more conscious and actively 
working towards creating such an environment. A case in point is the setting up of the 
garments city near Lahore to attract buyers and investors who are moving away from 
destinations where cheaper goods are produced at very low wages and in very poor and 
hazardous working conditions. This move by employers also reflects the importance they are 
giving to taking full advantage of the GSP-plus status granted by the EU to Pakistani imports; 
they are fully aware of the conditions related to respect for human rights and workers’ basic 
rights that need to be met to ensure this status is regularly extended.  
This may well be, therefore, an opportune time in Pakistan to raise the pillar of “more and 
better jobs” as an integral part of national economic policy. 
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Appendix A 
Some other consolidated results of the World Bank growth decomposition exercise are given 
below. 
Table A1: Contribution of employment changes to overall change in employment rate, 
2000/01 to 2010/11 
 Contribution to change in total 
employment rate (percent points) 
Percent contribution of sector to 
total employment rate growth 
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 
Agriculture -0.4 2.1 0.3 -11.8 69.8 8.7 
Industry 1.9 0.8 2.0 52.7 28.3 53.4 
Services 2.1 0.1 1.4 59.1 1.9 38.0 
Total employment rate 3.5 2.9 3.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Table A2: Contribution of employment changes to overall change in per capita GDP (value-
added), 2000/01 to 2010/11 
 Contribution to change in per 
capita GDP (value-added) 
Percent of total change in per 
capita GDP (value-added) 
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 
Agriculture -293.3 1,573.9 229.5 -4.5 66.7 3.2 
Industry 1,310.5 638.6 1,407.9 20.1 27.1 19.6 
Services 1,470.3 42.3 1,001.5 22.5 1.8 13.9 
Total contribution 2,487.5 2,254.8 2,638.9 38.1 95.6 36.7 
Table A3: Changes in output per worker by sectors, 2000/01 to 2010/11 
 Percent change in output per worker 
by sectors 
Contribution to change in total output 
per worker 
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 
Agriculture 5.9 -9.4 2.3 10.6 -1,054.1 4.6 
Industry 6.1 -3.8 2.2 11.8 -488.4 4.9 
Services 10.7 10.6 14.9 42.6 2,601.4 65.7 
Inter-sectoral shift  35.0 -958.9 24.8 
Total  13.2 0.2 11.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 
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Table A4: Contribution of within-sector changes in output per worker and inter-sectoral 
shifts to change in GDP (value-added) per capita, 2000/01 to 2010/11 
 Contribution to change in GDP 
(value-added) per capita 
Percent of total change in GDP 
(value-added) per capita 
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 
Agriculture 383.1 -688.5 150.1 5.9 -29.2 2.1 
Industry 426.1 -318.9 159.7 6.5 -13.5 2.2 
Services 1,540.9 1,699.0 2,138.8 23.6 72.0 29.8 
Inter-sectoral shift 1,264.4 -626.3 806.4 19.4 -26.5 11.2 
Total contribution to change in per 
capita GDP (value-added) 
3,614.6 65.3 3,255.0 55.4 2.8 45.3 
Source for all tables: World Bank JoGGs tool with data from Pakistan Economic Survey for 2006/07 and 2011/12 and 
World Bank growth calculations for Pakistan. 
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Appendix B 
Table B1: Estimated value-added by automotive sector, 2009/10 
 Value-added to value 
of production ratio* 
Value of sales 
(PRs million) 
Value-added 
(PRs million) 
Motorcars (0.277) 120,843 33,474 
Motorcycles and rickshaws (0.285) 57,848 16,486 
Buses/trucks (0.176) 16,979 2,988 
Tractors (0.247) 38,157 9,425 
Automotive parts (0.272) 167,802 45,642 
Total   108,015 
(USD1.3 billion) 
Total value-added in manufacturing   2,259,400 
Share of manufacturing (%)   4.8 
Percent of GDP   0.7 
Source: Pasha et al. (2011). 
Table B2: Estimated levels of production of different types of vehicles, 2000/01 to 2010/11 
Type of vehicle 2000/01 2005/06 2009/10 2010/11  
Cars 41,556 170,487 121,647 133,972  
1,300–1,800 cc 17,664 69,283 60,360 62,111  
1,000 cc 14,716 47,459 23,330 25,287  
800 cc 9,176 53,745 37,957 46,574  
Jeeps, pickups, LCVs  
Motorcycles, rickshaws 
 5,441 21,624 16,940 20,025  
Motorcycles 
Rickshaws 
117,858 817,387 
2,166 
1,481,111 
14,676 
1,710,841 
17,259 
 
Tractors 32,533 50,257 73,844 72,303  
Buses  1,073 661 526  
Trucks  4,593 3,691 2,932  
Source: Pasha et al. (2011). 
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Table B3: Estimated Employment in the Automotive Sector, 2009-10 
 Employment (number) 
Original equipment manufacturers 22,254 
Motorcars, etc. 5,440 
Motorcycles 12,220 
Buses/trucks 1,453 
Tractors 3,141 
Domestic parts manufacturers 1,87,070 
Total sectoral employment 209,324 
Sources: Pasha et al. (2011): Authors’ calculations using numbers from PAMA, EDB, PAAPAM, SBP, and CMI.  
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